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5Environmental Justice: Where are the Fracking Sites?
Elizabeth Adams
Abstract
This paper looks at the variables that determine the location of hydraulic fracturing 
wells.  Using cross-sectional data on Texas counties, we test whether county 
income level and the percentage of the population that is minority are significant 
indicators of well location.  This study mirrors other studies that focus on the 
location of undesirable land uses such as landfills.  Our study finds that income 
level and the size of the minority population are not statistically significant 
indicators of hydraulic fracturing well location.
I. Introduction
The method of hydraulic fracturing used in the oil and gas industry has 
been utilized for many years.  More recently in the natural gas industry, the method 
of hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, has been combined with 
horizontal drilling in order to access more gas from each well.  The well not only 
extends vertically into the deep shale basins, but also horizontally from the kickoff 
point up to 10,500 feet outwards (Hydraulic Fracturing). This new technique as 
well as the discovery of Marcellus shale along the east coast has brought fracking 
to the attention of the public at large.  The potential environmental and health 
impacts of fracking wells on the surrounding area will be discussed later in the 
paper and are widely debated.  The question of interest for this paper, however, is 
how great is the impact of local income levels and other demographic measures 
as indicators of where natural gas wells are located.
The question this paper focuses on is interesting because it investigates 
one example of externalities resulting from natural resource extraction.  The 
difficulty of these externalities is balancing the need for the service with the 
unaccounted for cost of accessing it.  To explore this a bit further, consider that 
natural gas could be the solution to the United States’ dependence on foreign oil 
because the country has many large shale deposits, the rock formation that holds 
6the natural gas.  Natural gas would also boost the economy as a new area of 
development.  It burns cleaner than other widely used fossil fuels so it could help 
solve problems with greenhouse gas emissions.  The downside of this venture 
is the externalities that come from drilling natural gas wells.  Research is just 
beginning to emerge on the health impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells for people 
and the environment.  This makes it difficult to form a strong argument for the 
existence of this particular negative externality.  Instead, this paper will simply 
look at where these wells are being located.
The initial motivation for this paper is the current debate on Marcellus 
shale.  Watching the documentary Gasland serves as further inspiration because 
the families that seem to be dealing with the problems associated with natural 
gas wells appear to have lower incomes.  The idea for the model used in this 
paper is inspired by the models set up by Boer et al. and Pastor et al.  These 
two articles investigate the claims of environmental racism with regard to the 
location of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF).  The research in 
this paper applies a similar model to the location of natural gas wells, which will 
be discussed further in the literature review section.  Texas counties are the focus 
of this analysis because data is most easily accessible for this area on all of the 
variables included in the model.
Assuming that there is some negative externality from natural gas wells, 
whether it is the loss in land aesthetics or water contamination, our interest is in 
the equality of the distribution of this externality.  Economists are interested in the 
location of sites that result in some negative externality, such as hazardous waste 
facilities and landfills, to see whether they are disproportionately located near a 
certain portion of the population.  This new area of interest has culminated as the 
environmental justice movement.  Environmental justice “is the principle that all 
people and communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and 
7public health laws and regulations” (Brulle 2006).  Is there environmental justice 
in the location of natural gas wells?  Similar questions have been asked by other 
researchers but we have not found another paper on the application to the natural 
gas industry.  
There are three economic theories that have been developed that 
pertain to the issues highlighted by the environmental justice movement: 
discrimination, the Coase theorem, and the theory of collective action (Hamilton 
1993).  Discrimination and the theory of collective action are the main points 
made by researchers in support of the environmental justice movement.  The 
results of Hamilton’s study indicate “that firms processing hazardous waste, when 
deciding where to expand capacity, do take into account variations in the potential 
for collective action to raise their costs” (Hamilton 1993).  This is just one 
specific, illustrative example of the theory of collective action.  Discrimination 
is very similar to this but references specific demographic characteristics as the 
distinguishing factor in firms’ decision-making with respect to the location of 
undesirable land uses.  
The Coase theorem alternatively states that “even in the presence of 
externalities an economy can always reach an efficient solution provided that the 
costs of making a deal are sufficiently low” (Krugman et al. 2007).  Applying this 
to the location of fracking wells, a well should be located where the benefit from 
the wells exceeds the costs.  One can argue this theory does not hold true because 
the health impact of the drilling exceeds the benefits to the economy.  This is 
an especially poignant argument today with the recent statement released by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  The EPA stated, in response to water 
contamination complaints from the community of Pavillion, Wyoming, that “the 
explanation best fitting the data…is that constituents associated with hydraulic 
fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer” (Llanos 
82011).  In the past, EPA studies have supported the findings of the natural gas 
companies that fracking does not cause water contamination.  New findings may 
change the current leniency the natural gas industry benefits from.
Before we discuss the empirical analysis behind the paper further, it 
is first important to understand some of the politics behind the controversy of 
hydraulic fracturing wells.  The main point that will be addressed here is the 
exemptions from federal regulations that the natural gas industry has accumulated. 
The most notable exemptions are from the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts as 
of 1990 and 1987 respectively (New York Times).  In 2005, Congress exempted 
natural gas drillers from having to provide detailed reports on the potential 
environmental impact of some of their activities, thus exempting them from the 
National Environmental Policy Act (New York Times).  Again in 2005, after an 
EPA study was challenged by one of its own members saying that the study’s 
conclusions were unsupported and that some members of the study’s peer review 
panel had conflicts of interest, Congress still exempted hydraulic fracturing from 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (New York Times).  Other exemptions for hydraulic 
fracturing include from the Superfund Act in 1980, the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right to Know Act in 1986, and exemption from the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1988 (New York Times).  This relatively large 
list of government approved exemptions from regulations that ultimately protect 
Americans’ health adds to our interest in the environmental justice claims that will 
be investigated in this paper.
II. Literature Review
Our interest in the topic was partially inspired by such articles as “The 
Gas Dilemma,” written by Bryan Walsh of Time Magazine that begins by noting 
that the great energy potential of natural gas comes with “the catch” that it could 
come with significant environmental and social costs.  The environmental justice 
9movement is interested in such situations as the equal distribution of these costs 
across society.  The movement has in recent times been gaining attention from 
more and more academic literature.  The goal of much of this literature is to 
determine whether or not demographic inequalities characterize the location of 
sites that pose some risk to the surrounding population.  Boer et al. considers 
the location of TSDF.  Other authors have studied the location of other “locally 
undesirable land uses” such as landfills (Been 1993).  One of these land uses 
that has not be researched in depth is the location of hydraulic fracturing wells. 
This paper adapts the methods used by other researchers on environmental justice 
issues to see if the locations of these wells are characterized by demographic 
inequalities.
The known impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells are habitat fragmentation 
and the risk of a fluid spill.  Hazardous chemicals are used in fracking to break 
the shale.  When the fluids come back up, they are moved to a membrane-lined 
storage pad to dry out so the water from the mixture can evaporate.  If the pad 
tears or there are heavy rains during this process, these pads can develop leaks or 
overflow.  A controversial hazard of fracking wells is the potential contamination 
of groundwater and more specifically residential wells.  This would be caused 
by the release of Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM).  When the 
shale is broken, NORMs can leak up through the ground along with some of 
the fracking fluids.  With these risks in mind, we continue our review of related 
studies to see how their methods can be applied to this new land use.
The econometric model used in this paper utilizes variables relevant 
to this study from previous literature that also evaluates environmental justice 
claims.  In many of the other studies there are measures of the presence of an 
undesirable land use such as TSDF.  This study uses a measure of the number of 
wells in a county as the dependent variable (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). 
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In similar studies there are usually independent variables that account for logical 
reasons for the location of such a facility such as community waste generation 
or the cost of locating in an area (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).  The study 
presented in this paper similarly uses average land value to account for the cost of 
locating a well in a specific area.
In the study done by Boer et al., the authors found both median household 
income and per capita income to have statistically significant coefficients so this 
study uses median household income because it is less influenced by outliers 
(Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).  The final major influence you will see in this 
paper from previous literature is the use of simultaneous equations.  The use of 
this type of model is consistent with the article written by Pastor et al., which 
investigates the disproportionate siting and minority move-in hypotheses.  This 
brief overview justifies the modeling techniques used here because it shows that 
while this study explores a different issues, its structure is based on previously 
peer-reviewed work.
III. Modeling
The basis of the model in this paper is the question of whether or not 
local income levels and other demographics can indicate to a certain extent 
where natural gas wells are located.  There is evidence both for and against 
the hypothesis that these factors do impact well location.  One specific claim 
related to the environmental justice argument is that firms consider the potential 
for communities to mobilize and engage in collective action in deciding where 
to locate locally undesirable land uses (Hamilton 1993).  Hamilton finds that 
commercial hazardous waste firms did take this factor into account in deciding 
where to add capacity during the period 1987-1992.  His explanation of this result 
is that “the differing degree to which groups organize to demand compensation 
and raise a firm’s costs of choosing a particular location drives a wedge between 
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the social costs of its externalities and the costs voiced through the political 
process of its site selection” and therefore challenges the outcome of the Coase 
theorem (Hamilton 1993).  The location where the potential for collective action 
is the least may not be where the damage of its externalities is the least (Hamilton 
1993).  This is just one piece of evidence from past research that suggests that 
demographic characteristics that stereotypically suggest less potential for 
collective action significantly impact the location of facilities that bring with it 
negative externalities born by the surrounding community.
Other potential evidence that would support our hypothesis would be 
if the coefficients on the income and/or the minority population variables are 
statistically significant in difference from 0 given our data on fracking wells 
and demographics of counties in Texas.  Contradicting evidence would be if the 
coefficients on the previous variables were not statistically significant yet the 
coefficients on the control variables were.  To test to see what evidence can be 
gathered from this analysis we first used the following model:
The hypothesis is that the income and minority population variables do significantly 
impact the number of wells within a county.  These two variables are the focus of 
this research.  The control variables include a proxy variable for the presence of 
natural gas (Resource), population size (Population), and the land area of a county 
(Land).  Hamilton’s paper illustrates the reason why the theory holds that these 
two variables may be significant, because stereotypically both low income and 
minority communities are seen as having less collective action potential against 
such issues as fracking well location.  Resource accounts for the fact that firms 
will build wells where there is natural gas to extract.  Population and Land are 
included because they are control variables included in other comparable models 
and they account for the fact that the less land there is open, the fewer wells that 
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can be built due to the space required for the construction.  According to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, each natural 
gas well site requires between 3 to 5 acres when fully constructed.
 The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is first used to estimate the 
coefficients of the multivariable regression but the initial model is not correctly 
specified.  We find that our initial model has simultaneity bias and correct for this 
by using the two-stage lease squares (2SLS) method.  Additional variables are 
included after further research.  The final model we work with is a simultaneous 
equations model where Wells and Income are endogenous variables and Resource, 
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, and Education are exogenous variables.  The 
simultaneous equations that will be estimated are as follows:
Opponents to environmental justice claims argue that firms’ do not choose to 
locate an undesirable land use in low income communities.  They argue that the 
location of the site is due to the cost of land because land costs are usually lower 
in low income communities or that low income households often relocate near 
these sites because land costs decrease.  We do not have panel data to account for 
simultaneous changes in number of wells and land value.  Instead, we use county 
income level as the instrumental variable.  This study therefore cannot imply 
anything about the firms’ or the communities’ decision making.  It is assumed 
that county demographics before the more widespread construction of natural 
gas wells are determined by the exogenous variable for 1997 land value.  It is 
also assumed that this land value is equivalent to the price natural gas companies 
would have to pay in order to locate a well there.  Given these two assumptions, 
we can then account for the significance of demographic characteristics and the 
included control variables on the number of wells in a county.  The hypothesis 
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is that county income levels do have a significant impact on the number of 
wells located in the county, holding constant the impact of all other explanatory 
variables.  This hypothesis would support environmental justice claims.  We 
continue with a more in depth description of the data used in this analysis before 
examining the regression results.
IV. Data
 The ideal data set would be a panel data set including data on all counties 
in the United States for a number of time periods.  The data would include 
measures of the number of wells built during each time period, the amount of 
accessible shale within each county, population density, the average value of 
land, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the 
county population that is minority, and the median income of each county for each 
specified time period.  Acquiring this data would allow the study to better analyze 
the firms’ decisions on locating natural gas wells.  By lagging some variables such 
as income, the number of wells built in the next time period would presumably 
reflect data the decision maker would have from the previous period.  With this 
data, the impact of demographics such as income level and minority could be 
better isolated from the impact of land value on firms’ decision-making.  Due to 
time restrictions and data availability, cross-sectional data is used over all counties 
in Texas, a state with a large presence of the natural gas industry.
 A sample of all Texas counties that had appropriate data was included in 
this model.  This sample of 233 counties only excluded 21 counties due to missing 
data.  The variables included in the final regression model are Wells, Resource, 
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, Income, and Education.  Table 1 includes 
descriptions of these variables and lists their sources and Figure 1 provides the 
basic statistics on each variable.
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Table 1
Figure1
Note that Wells, Income, and Resource have the largest standard deviations 
suggesting that these variables vary most about their mean relative to other 
included variables.  Our empirical analysis may find that the variation in Wells is 
best explained by the variation of Income and/or Resource.  These observations 
are purely speculative.
V. Evidence
 As mentioned before, the analysis began with a multiple regression 
model that was estimated using OLS.  This model was first estimated using a 
random sample of 30 counties in Texas.  After the data on all counties in Texas 
were collected, the regression model was run again with the same specification. 
Using the Ramsey RESET test, we found that the old model specification no 
longer fit the data.  With both regressions there were heteroscedasticity problems, 
   e duc a t i on         233    16 . 49313    6 . 356069        6 . 6        43 . 1
   v a l ue 1997         233    644. 1245    716. 5479         30        5899
                                                                      
  popde ns i t y          234    103. 5985    309. 8335         . 1        2718
    mi nor i t y          234    40 . 49573    21 . 43345          6          97
      i nc ome          234    41162. 29    9592. 201      21841      80548
    r e s our c e          234    2 . 85e +07    7 . 30e +07          0    6 . 49e +08
       we l l s          234    432. 8162    927. 3171          0        6003
                                                                      
    Va r i a bl e          Obs         Me a n    S t d.  De v .        Mi n        Ma x
.  s umma r i z e  we l l s  r e s our c e  i nc ome  mi nor i t y  popde ns i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
Variable
Wells
Resource
PopDensity
Minority
Value1997
Income
Education
 
Description
Number of regular producing gas wells as of 
September 2010
Gas wells gas production in thousands of cubic 
feet; measured from January to December 2010
Persons per square mile, 2010
2010 minority population as percentage of total 
population
1997 average county market value of acre of land
2009 Median household income
2005-2009 percentage of population age 25+ with 
bachelor’s degree or higher
Source
Railroad Commission 
of Texas
Railroad Commission 
of Texas
US Census Bureau
US Census Bureau
Texas A&M Institute 
of Renewable Natural 
Resources
US Census Bureau
US Census Bureau
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which were corrected for by using robust standard errors.  The results of these 
initial regressions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Variables N=30P-values
N=30
Coefficients
N=233
P-values
N=233
Coefficients
Resource 0.03 6.49*10-6 0.00 8.64*10-6
Population 0.27 -0.0026 0.07 -0.00039
Minority 0.06 2772.626 0.06 568.54
Income 0.12 0.0758 0.04 0.015
Land 0.28 0.2511 0.11 0.025
After attempting logical model specification changes using OLS regression 
methods, the model was tested for simultaneity bias using the Hausman 
Specification Test.  In this process, we decided to include slightly different 
variables reflecting further research.  The test results, shown in Figure 2, indicate 
that the model does have simultaneity bias because the Prob>F value (0.01) is less 
than 0.05.  In other words, the impact of the residuals from running a regression 
of the reduced form equations is significant in difference from 0.  This also means 
that there is a feedback loop so to correct for this we construct the simultaneous 
equations discussed above and estimate them using 2SLS.  The regression results 
are shown in Figure 3.  Before interpreting the regression results, it is also 
important to note that the 2SLS model was also tested to see if Income was a 
strong instrumental variable.  The Stata output from this test is shown in Figure 4. 
The OLS regression of the instrumental variable Income on all included variables 
and the identifying variable, Education, indicates that Income is a good instrument 
because the Prob>F value (0.00) is less than the 0.05 level of significance so we 
16
can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all included variables are 0. 
In other words, the Adjusted-R2 is statistically significant in difference from 0.
Figure 2
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Figure 3
                                                                              
I ns t r ume nt s :    r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
I ns t r ume nt e d:   i nc ome
                                                                              
       _ c ons      1916. 833     1743. 2      1 . 10    0 . 273    - 1518. 088    5351. 755
   v a l ue 1997     . 4811013   . 1198733     4 . 01    0 . 000     . 2448946    . 7173079
    mi nor i t y     - 3 . 345217   6 . 346545    - 0 . 53    0 . 599    - 15 . 85089    9 . 160455
  popde ns i t y     - . 7137522   . 3390545    - 2 . 11    0 . 036    - 1 . 381849   - . 0456557
    r e s our c e      9 . 79e - 06   9 . 12e - 07    10 . 73    0 . 000     7 . 99e - 06    . 0000116
      i nc ome     - . 0451702    . 038675    - 1 . 17    0 . 244    - . 1213782    . 0310378
                                                                              
       we l l s         Coe f .    S t d.  E r r .       t     P>| t |      [ 95% Conf .  I nt e r v a l ]
                                                                              
       T ot a l      200223326   232  863031. 578           Root  MS E       =  798. 98
                                                       Adj  R- s qua r e d =  0 . 2603
    Re s i dua l      144908993   227  638365. 607           R- s qua r e d     =  0 . 2763
       Mode l     55314333. 4      5   11062866. 7            Pr ob > F       =  0 . 0000
                                                       F (   5 ,    227)  =   34 . 84
      S our c e          S S        df        MS               Numbe r  of  obs  =     233
I ns t r ume nt a l  v a r i a bl e s  ( 2S L S )  r e gr e s s i on
> y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on)
.  i v r e g we l l s  r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 ( i nc ome = popde ns i t y  mi nor i t
Figure 4
                                                                              
       _ c ons       41294. 8    1974. 299    20 . 92    0 . 000      37404. 5     45185. 09
   e duc a t i on     244. 3049   99 . 78071     2 . 45    0 . 015      47 . 6901    440. 9198
   v a l ue 1997     . 9108222   1 . 068944     0 . 85    0 . 395    - 1 . 195499    3 . 017144
    mi nor i t y     - 142. 6194   26 . 65511    - 5 . 35    0 . 000    - 195. 1425   - 90 . 09638
  popde ns i t y      6 . 732463   2 . 319925     2 . 90    0 . 004     2 . 161121    11 . 30381
    r e s our c e      . 0000132   7 . 85e - 06     1 . 68    0 . 095    - 2 . 30e - 06    . 0000286
                                                                              
      i nc ome         Coe f .    S t d.  E r r .       t     P>| t |      [ 95% Conf .  I nt e r v a l ]
                                                                              
       T ot a l     2 . 1063e +10   232  90790902. 5            Root  MS E       =  8437. 6
                                                       Adj  R- s qua r e d =  0 . 2159
    Re s i dua l     1 . 6161e +10   227  71192896. 9            R- s qua r e d     =  0 . 2328
       Mode l     4 . 9027e +09     5    980540354           Pr ob > F       =  0 . 0000
                                                       F (   5 ,    227)  =   13 . 77
      S our c e          S S        df        MS               Numbe r  of  obs  =     233
.  r e gr e s s  i nc ome  r e s our c e  popde ns i t y  mi nor i t y  v a l ue 1997 e duc a t i on
 The p-values for Resource (0.00), PopDensity (0.04), and Value1997 
(0.00) indicate that we can reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on 
these variables are 0.  In other words, their coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant in difference from 0.  The coefficients on these variables do all have the 
expected sign.  The coefficient on Resource is positive, which is logical because if 
there is more natural gas in a county, there should be more wells to extract it.  The 
coefficients on PopDensity and Value1997 are not as expected.  This possibly can 
be explained by an unaccounted for model specification problem.
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Previous literature has found that there is a parabolic relationship 
between the presence of an undesirable land use site and income.  Boer et al. 
found that “income has first a positive, then a negative effect on TSDF location, 
a pattern that likely reflects the fact that the poorest communities have little 
economic activity while wealthier communities have the economic and political 
power to resist negative environmental externalities.”  This finding may also 
apply to PopDensity and Value1997.  Very desolate areas where land is not 
habitable may correspond with a type of land where shale deposits are also not 
often found while very populated areas, where water and organic materials are 
more abundant, are too populated for the construction of a natural gas well.  This 
example, purely speculative, describes a similar situation to that found by Boer 
et al.  A step for further research would be to include a squared term.  A similar 
example could be constructed for Value1997.  This relationship is not accounted 
for by the current model and could explain the unexpected sign of the coefficients. 
The final observation from this regression analysis that is pertinent to our study 
is that the sign of the coefficient on Income, although not significant in difference 
from 0, has the hypothesized sign.  The coefficient is negative suggesting that 
if income increases, the number of wells in that county will decrease, holding 
constant the impact of all other variables.  The coefficient on Minority is also 
negative, contrary to our hypothesis.  The weaknesses of this study are the lack of 
panel data and the model specification.  Further research is needed on this issue 
to gain better insight into the location of these wells as the natural gas industry 
continues to grow.
VI. Conclusions
 Although the model does not indicant that the impacts of income and 
minority status on the number of wells in a county are significant, further research 
is necessary to look at this relationship across time.  We believe that analysis using 
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panel data may find different results or at least offer a more clear interpretation 
and application of findings.  This study suggests that income and the percentage 
of the population that is a minority are not significant indicators of where natural 
gas wells are located in Texas counties.  These findings challenge claims made by 
the environmental justice movement.  This does not mean, however, that there is 
any less of a need to do further research on the possible health and environmental 
impacts of hydraulic fracturing.  Further analytical research is needed in on the 
issue of fracking well location that can address the issues of the best unit of 
observation (county, census tract, borough, etc) that should be used in the analysis 
and data limitations.  Research is crucial for appropriate policy implementation 
and public understanding especially as the natural gas industry expands.
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The Staffing of Presidential Assistants: Their Effect on 
Presidential Success in the House of Representatives
Nicholas Jesteadt
Abstract
This paper examines the Congressional success of United States Presidents 
based on the reported Congressional Quarterly Presidential Box Scores. Their 
individual success is examined as an effect of the senior staff member a President 
chooses and whether they are chosen from the campaign, personal experience, 
or previous administrations. It is important for a President to consider the 
origins of these staffers as these Assistants to the President act as the body of the 
President’s administration. The econometric analysis presented reveals several 
interesting results. First, the predominance of a President to choose staff members 
from his campaign shows no significant impact on his Congressional relations 
and success. Second, staff members chosen from personal experience have a 
negatively correlated hindrance on success. Finally, those members chosen for 
their experience in previous administrations has a positive impact on Presidential 
success. This research is used to supplement the existing, qualitative research on 
the subject through regression analysis.
I. Introduction
 At the beginning of every new Presidential administration, during the 
transition period, a President is faced with several critical choices, namely: what 
staff he should pick as his Assistants to the President. Assistants to the President 
are the senior staffers in the White House. They work with the President daily, 
they have offices in the White House, and they prepare advice sheets and 
recommendations for every policy that comes in the President’s door. He looks to 
them for those recommendations. There are also several that work with Congress, 
acting as a Liaison between the two and a defender of the President’s agenda. It 
is critical that the President picks the right people for the jobs because they could 
influence his success.
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 What are the right people for the job? Who should the President hire 
for those positions? The purpose of this paper is to determine if the types of staff 
members a President picks as his Assistants influence his success and secondly, 
what types of staff members provide a positive influence on that success.
 This paper aims to provide insight to future Presidents as they choose 
the people they want for the different Assistant positions. It also provides insight 
to political pundits as they evaluate the likely success of a President over his 
four or eight year term. Also, it provides a lens with which to evaluate the past 
performances and staff choices of Presidents. The findings of this paper may also 
be significant to gubernatorial success and local elections and perhaps even to 
other global governments in its determination of ideal staff member backgrounds.
 Previous literature has only just begun evaluating the factors that cause 
political success. Bond and Fleischer (1990) and Covington, et al (1995) are just 
a few of the papers that have begun exploring this topic. Their previous work 
laid the foundation for this paper to explore the possibility of Assistants to the 
President influencing presidential success, specifically in the legislative arena of 
the House of Representatives.
 In the next section, I will describe the previous literature on the topic, 
including papers that postulated and laid the framework for my study but did 
not provide any empirical background. Being that this is a novel study, I will 
also describe similar studies in the field of presidential legislative success and 
the variables they tested. In section three, I will present the entity-demeaned OLS 
equation being used to model this data and will discuss the relevant variables. In 
section four I will discuss and make observations about the data collected to test 
my hypothesis, and in section five, I will perform an empirical analysis of my 
hypothesis using the collected data to validate or negate previous literature that 
based their conclusions on assumptions. Finally, I will conclude and summarize 
my findings.
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II. Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add statistical evidence to the current theoretic 
literature on the effect of a President’s senior staff on the success of the administration. 
Most current papers on the topic are observational and base their conclusions on 
several assumptions. They do not justify their conclusions with any concrete data. In 
this paper, I will attempt to explain the success of a Presidential legislative success 
with the type of senior staff members in the administration.
For example, Carey examines Presidential staffing in the sixties and 
seventies and critiques the Johnson and Nixon administrations for their choices 
in senior officials – namely assistants to the President (1969). They suggest that 
more experienced staffers, who have engaged in the framework of staffing work, 
will better aid the President in completing his work. Carey’s paper does not 
specifically focus on Presidential “success” but he does comment on Presidential 
“effectiveness” and “efficiency.” Again, this paper is merely critical commentary 
and does not provide any statistical evidence.
Hoxie continued evaluating presidential staff choices for the Ford and 
Carter administrations, concluding that a President should select as his aides, men 
“whose goals and experience involve service to more than a single politician” 
(1980). Hoxie also concludes that “emotional dependency by a President” on his 
aides, “should be avoided as far as possible. The argument is that staff members 
with prior experience have a positive relationship with the success of a relationship 
and staff members with personal relationships to the President have a negative 
relationship. Hoxie’s paper adds no empirical support to these conclusions. The 
focus of this paper is to make “relationship” and “past experience” variables in the 
model evaluating presidential success.
King and Riddlesperger modernize this argument in their evaluation of 
the Clinton staffing choices (1996). They argue most definitively that a President’s 
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success in office is contingent upon the performance of the staffers he chooses for 
administrative positions. King and Riddlesperger also provide the last variable 
that this paper will test, staff that came from the campaign. Those involved on 
a Presidential campaign will often be given a job in the administrations; this is 
known as riding the President’s coattails. King mentions the prevalence of staffers 
from the campaign but does not argue their directional effect on presidential 
success.
As noted, the current literature on this topic does not provide any 
empirical data on the topic so this paper is novel. This paper will either add 
credence or help negate the previously mentioned work on this subject. It will be 
the statistical backing to their assumptions and conclusions.1
After I had researched the historical commentary on this issue, I reference 
past work on many closely related subjects to determine pertinent control 
variables for the model and help define the dependent variable. Only recently has 
the presidency been evaluated statistically: Bond and Fleischer (1990), Covington 
et al (1995), Durham et al (2003) all test various political variables on the success 
of the president. In these papers, roll call votes, compiled by Congressional 
Quarterly, are used as numerical indicators of Presidential success in Congress. 
Freund concedes that measuring Presidential success as the relationship between 
the President and Congress is only perspective of “success” (2004). However, for 
the purpose of this paper, that perspective will be used as the indicator of success.
Vital Statistics on the Presidency is a publication by Congressional 
Quarterly that documents the success rate of Presidents from Eisenhower to 
George W. Bush. The rate is measured as the number of bills that pass that a 
1  David E. Lewis wrote The Politics of Presidential Appointments (2008) that performs statistical 
analysis and regressions of staff characteristics on the success of Presidential administrations; 
however, it focuses on the bureaucracy, and not senior officials (Assistants to the President). While 
it was referenced for ideas, it was not heavily used in determining theory, model specification or 
past works.
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President supports in addition to the number of bills that fail that a President does 
not support divided by the total number of bills that the President takes a position 
on (2008). This paper will use those same figures.
Rivers and Rose conducted a probability study of individual bills 
supported by Presidential administrations, passing in the House of Representatives 
(1985). Using a sample of over 400 bills from 1954 to 1972, they tested for the 
effect of Presidential public opinion on the passing of presidentially backed bills. 
Their results suggest that popularity is barely significant at the 10% level. The 
study failed to control for the differing types of bills; they concluded that a bill on 
the economy is equal to a bill on foreign affairs. With such a specific dependent 
variable, that lack of clarity likely skewed their data.
Ostrom and Simon conducted a sample of Presidential legislative success 
yearly from 1953 to 1980 and found public approval to be statistically significant 
and positively correlated with success rates (1985). This much more exhaustive 
study controls for several more factors than Rivers and Rose and evaluates success 
overall rather than on individual bills. Ostrom and Simon provide public opinion 
as a control for this paper.
Edwards, Barrett and Peake had a sample of 638 pieces of “significant” 
legislation that failed to pass and evaluated that failure as a result of divided 
government (1997). Divided government had a t-statistic of 4.00 and was 
positively correlated with the failure of presidentially supported bills in Congress. 
This led them to conclude that the party controlling Congress is significant in 
determining the success rate of the President. 
This paper will add to the literature that has regressed different 
explanatory variables on legislative presidential success, while remaining 
completely unique on the explanatory variables being tested. Previous regressions 
will also be used as references for which to base control variables in this model 
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on. With the amount of literature being written on this subject already, this should 
be a powerful addition. Finally, the statistical findings of this paper will help to 
refute some of the generalized commentary on presidential staffing.
III. Modeling
The goal is to see if presidential legislative success is significantly affected 
by the type of staff members a President chooses as his Assistants. Specifically, 
those members that served in previous administrations should positively influence 
legislative success while those that worked on the campaign and have a personal 
relationship with the President should negatively influence legislative success.
This hypothesis will be modeled using an entity-demeaned OLS 
regression that averages the data for each administration from Gerald Ford to 
George W. Bush, differentiating between first and second terms. The reason 
is to eliminate any unobservable administration-specific – or term-specific – 
characteristics that pertain to their success in the House of Representatives. For 
example, Reagan may have had a better repertoire with members of the House of 
Representatives that led to higher success rates. By averaging each President’s 
success and deviating their individual successes from that mean, President specific 
variables should be accounted for. The estimated model is:
SucRate
t
 = β
0
 + β
1
*Approval
t
 + β
2
*Party
t
 + β
3
*Padmin
t
 + β
4
*Relate
t
 + 
β
5
*Campaign
t
 + e
t
    (1)
 
 The dependent variable is a President’s legislative success rate in the 
House of Representatives, measured annually. This variable, SucRatet, is a 
function of the bills that the President supported, that passed, and the bills that 
the President opposed, that did not pass. I control for the effects of presidential 
public approval and the majority party in the House of Representatives. 
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Presidential public approval, as referenced in Ostrom and Simon (1985), reflects 
the constituency’s support of the President’s agenda. The logic is that House 
Representatives should largely vote similar to their constituency. Therefore, the 
coefficient on Approval, β
1
 should be positive – the greater constituent approval, 
the greater the presidential influence in Congress. The effect of political party in 
the House of Representatives is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the 
House majority is the same party as the President and “0” if the House majority 
is the opposite party of the President. As previously explained, if the House is the 
same political party as the President, the House will likely agree with and pass 
more of the President’s supported legislation. The coefficient on Party, β
2
 should 
be positive also.
 The variables measuring staff background – previous relationship to 
the President, previous administration positions, and campaign work – are more 
difficult to measure in the model. The Assistants to the President that also served 
in previous administrations, the variable Padmint, are measured as a percentage 
of the Assistants in any given year that have served under any previous President. 
Hoxie suggests that previous administrative experience will aid the success 
of the current President.2 As a result, the coefficient estimate on Padmin
t
, β
3
 is 
conjectured to be positive.
 The Assistants to the President that were notably chosen for their 
position because of their involvement in the Presidential campaign – either the 
initial or, when appropriate, re-election, denoted by the variable Campaign
t
, are 
measured as a percentage of the Assistants in any given year that were involved 
in that President’s campaign. However, while campaign mentality is productive 
and efficient in the eventual succession of the candidate to the Presidency, that 
mentality becomes an inhibitor. The campaign mentality is idealistic and different 
2 As noted above, Hoxie (1980).
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from the necessary productivity needed for legislative affairs and Congressional 
communications. Therefore, I posit that the coefficient estimate on Campaign
t
, β
4
 
will be negative.
 Finally, there are the Assistants to the President that have had a 
longstanding relationship with the President – likely a long term acquaintance or 
friendship – is measured by the variable Relate
t
. It is measured as the percentage of 
the Assistants that are chosen based on their personal affiliation with the President. 
While friendships are key to the successful President, long term friendships and 
personal relations could lead to bias in the President’s judgment. Again I speculate 
that the coefficient on Relate
t
, β
5
 is negative.
 In the data section I will explain the specific data sets used to describe 
presidential success rates and the control variables but I will now briefly explain 
how the characteristic variables were measured.
 The White House, every year, produces The White House Government 
Manual, which lists the Assistants to the President in the White House Office 
(WHO). A large portion of those Assistants have profiles in Who’s Who in 
American Politics, the autobiographies of the Presidents themselves, or in historic 
reports on the individual Presidents and their staff. Congressional Quarterly has 
been combining that data for their research guide to the evolution of the White 
House Staff from George Washington to Barack Obama. Fortunately, I have 
been part of that data collection. Every Assistant to the President listed in the 
Government Manual for each year can be demarcated as being from a previous 
administration (P), having a personal repertoire with the President (R), being 
selected from the campaign (C), or being from none of these categories (N). Once 
the total Assistants to the President have been tabulated and denoted with one or 
multiple of these tags, they were then converted into percent form. The labels – 
P, R or C – are then transformed into percentages of the total Assistants to the 
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President for every year.3 Those percentages were then used as the annual values 
to compare with the President’s legislative success rates.
IV. Data
 This paper focuses on the period from 1974 when the Ford Presidency 
began to 2008, the end of the Bush Presidency. CQ Press had compiled Presidential 
Success Scores during that time that serve as the data set reflecting the dependent 
variable in this study. Ideally, a variable would be created that composited several 
administrative factors into the category of “Presidential Success.” However, this 
paper is focusing solely on Presidential success in the legislative arena, particularly 
the House of Representatives. As mentioned, CQ compiles this data as the percentage 
of bills where the decision of Congress reflected the position of the President.4
 The control variables include presidential public approval ratings and 
whether the House of Representatives was the same political party as the President 
in any given year. Previously written, the party variable is a dummy variable. The 
public approval variable is an annual average of bi-weekly Gallup-Poll results on 
the popularity of the President. 
 The data set on the staffing variables was generated – mentioned above 
– from intensive research on the individual Assistants to the President and their 
connection (be it campaign, relationship, or previous administration) to the 
President. The amount of work that went into investigating the backgrounds 
of these individuals attests to the accuracy of the data set. Previous literature, 
including King and Riddlesperger (1996), has included variables such as 
“relationship to the President” but they use estimates of the percentage of staffers 
that are “friends” with the President over the course of their term rather than a 
year by year analysis of the men that served in the senior staffing level positions.
3 That is labeled “Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels” and is located in the Appendix.
4 That is labeled “Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives” and is located 
in the Appendix.
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 Before describing the data, it is important to note that the Ford Presidency 
did not have any staffers from the campaign simply because Ford did not have 
a campaign. Once Nixon resigned, Ford assumed the role of the Presidency, 
with many of Nixon’s previous administration. He did not get to choose his own 
people. This could bias the data so a separate regression will be run excluding the 
data from 1974 through 1976 to see if any significant changes can be seen.
 Before I continue, it is significant to note that from 1974 to 2008, the 
number of Assistants to the President grew from 10 to 17 reaching record highs of 
27 during the Clinton administration. As the number of Assistants grows so does 
the number of people demanding the President’s attention and giving him advice. 
This could affect the receptiveness of the President and the number of Assistants 
that are actually influencing the President may be difficult to account for. It is the 
hope in this paper that by using the entity-demeaned OLS regression some of 
these unknown and uncontrollable factors will be reduced to a minimum so as to 
get the most accurate results.
Figure 1: Variable Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
SucRatet 35 55.19% 20.79 15.4% 87.3%
Approvalt 35 51.63% 11.69 26.0% 73.3%
Padmint 35 23.6% 24.3 0.0% 92.0%
Relatet 35 25.6% 16.2 0.0% 63.0%
Campaignt 35 44.5% 24.5 0.0% 100.0%
 Figure 1 depicts the summary statistics of the included variables except 
for Party
t
 because that is a dummy variable. The statistics provide insight into 
the evolution of staff through these recent administrations. In 1978, 100% of 
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the Assistants to the President came from the campaign. President Carter was 
dedicated to choosing those that had served him during the campaign. He was a 
strong advocate of rewarding his staff.
 In 1989, there was a 92% high of senior staff members that had come 
from past administrations. When George H.W. Bush won election, the Reagan era 
continued and he continued the previous administration with many of the same 
Assistant staff.
 It is also noteworthy that at different times throughout the time period in 
the study a President purged his staff of all those from a certain background. It is 
clear that as directives changed in each administration, the types of senior staffers 
were adjusted. Backgrounds were scrutinized and removed to help the President 
succeed and receive good advice.
 Interestingly, the legislative success rate of the President, on average for 
every administration, is around 50%. The President will typically succeed half of 
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Figure 2: Presidential Legislative Success Rates in the House of 
Representatives
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the time and fail half of the time. This observation demands the answer as to how 
a President can succeed more than 50% of the time. In fact, a successful President 
could be evaluated as one who is above that threshold while a weak President is 
evaluated as one below it.
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Figure 1: Staff % on campaign, relationship, previous 
administration over time 
 The success over time 
graph is also shown in Figure 2. 
During the first year it is typical 
that the President will have greater 
success than his later years because 
of the “Honeymoon” period that 
Congress grants him. Most of 
that fluctuation can be explained 
by the same political party as 
the President being in power 
during those years; however, it is 
noteworthy that the success rates 
of both Clinton and George W. 
Bush reached record heights in the 
early portion of their presidency as 
they both supported military fund 
allocations. 
 Figure 3 depicts the 
three staff measures against time. 
Past administration experience 
over time mirrors the graph of 
presidential success over time. 
Relationship to the president 
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seems to be the inverse to the graph of presidential success over time. Finally, 
campaign involvement also seems to inversely mirror presidential success, 
although not as definitively.
V. Empirical Evidence
 The table below shows the OLS regression results. Regression (1)5  was 
not entity-demeaned so that it could be compared to Regression (2) that is entity-
demeaned. The variation between the two regressions shows the necessity of using 
entity-demeaned OLS because it controls for administration specific variables.
Figure 4: OLS results for the legislative success of the President
  (1) (2)
Popularity .123 .024
  (0.69) (0.15)
Party  36.12 46.92
  (6.66)*** (8.35)***
Padmin  6.92 26.89
  (0.82) (2.04)**
Relate  15.80 11.12
  (1.01) (0.73)
Campaign -4.54 18.93
  (0.49) (1.62)
Entity Demeaned No Yes
Observations 35 35
Adj-R-squared 0.73 0.83
  
Durbin Watson Stat 1.81 2.28
Serial Correlation Possible Possible
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level
of significance indicating 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
______________
5 This was my first regression performed; it was not until later that I realized I should account for 
administration specific variables by using entity-demeaned OLS. That is why it is included.
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 Both of these regressions included the data from 1974 to 1976 because 
I first noticed the possibility of serial correlation, being that this data set is a time 
trend. The Durbin-Watson statistic for both regressions falls within the uncertain 
region of the critical Durbin-Watson statistic values. This led me to evaluate the 
residuals against the lagged residuals (provided in Figure 5). Aside from a few 
outliers, there is an upward sloping pattern in the residuals. I attempted to correct 
for this serial correlation with a time trend and by weighting using the Prais-
Winsten method of Generalized Least Squared. However, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic remained in the uncertain region. 
 I corrected for the presence of autocorrelation using first differences 
– the variable minus the one period lag of that variable. Those results, entity-
demeaned, are provided in the table below. Regression (3) is the first difference 
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Figure 5: Residuals vs. Lagged Residuals, Regression (2)
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OLS including the 1974-1976 time period and Regression (4) is the first difference 
OLS excluding the 1974-1976 time period.
 Again, the serial correlation was removed in Regression (3) – see Figure 
7 – while it is still inconclusive as to the serial correlation in Regression (4). 
The Durbin-Watson statistic for Regression (3) is above the upper critical statistic 
while the statistic for Regression (4) is at the edge of the upper statistic.
 Looking at both regressions numbered (3) and (4) we see that the 
popularity coefficient, even differenced, remains statistically insignificant. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that β1 is zero at even the 10% level of 
significance. Also important to both regressions, the political party variable 
coefficient, β2, is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 percent 
level of significance. This significance was also seen in regressions numbered (1) 
and (2) even prior to the first differences.
Figure 2: OLS results (serial correlation corrected) for the legislative 
success of the President
1st Difference (3) (4)
Popularity .172
(0.70)
.186
(0.73)
Party 77.92
(7.19)***
77.86
(11.29)***
Padmin 8.25
(1.77)*
8.01
(1.95)*
Relate -8.58
(1.77)*
-9.54
(1.75)*
Campaign -7.47
(0.56)
-7.32
(0.41)
Entity Demeaned Yes Yes
Observations 29 27
Adj-R-squared 0.71 0.71
Durbin Watson stat 2.34 1.97
Serial Correlation No Possibly
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level of significance indicating 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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 Focusing on Regression (3), we see that the coefficient on percentage 
of Assistants that served in previous administrations is statistically significant 
in difference from zero at the 10% level. As expected, the coefficient estimate 
is positive. As a President adds staff members with previous experience, their 
predicted legislative success is likely to rise. This makes sense because former 
administration officials have already experienced the White House. They know 
how it functions and how to perform best. Also, the coefficient on the percentage 
of Assistants with a previous relationship to the President is statistically significant 
in difference from zero at the ten percent level. Again, as expected by this paper’s 
hypothesis, the coefficient estimate is negative. As assumed, and argued by Hoxie, 
a relationship to the President deters that President’s success because they bias the 
President’s judgment. 
 In both Regression (3) and (4), the coefficient on the percentage of 
Assistants that originated from the campaign is not statistically significant in 
difference from zero. Multicollinearity between Campaign and Relate was tested 
but found to be minimal. It may just not be as important to determining presidential 
success as suggested by previous literature or my hypothesis. 
 Using Regression (4) without the 1974-1976 time period, there are a few 
slight differences. The coefficients on Party, Padmin, and Relate are largely to the 
same magnitude and have largely the same t-statistics.
 The Adjusted R-squared value in both is around 0.71 indicating that 
71% of the variation in presidential legislative success scores is explained by the 
variation in the included variables. The Probability>F value is also 0.000 for both 
regressions indicating that a relationship does exist and that the R-squared value 
is statistically significant in difference from zero.
 This paper’s hypothesis suggested that the type of Assistants a President 
picks for his senior staff influences his legislative success and that testable 
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characteristics were Assistants from the campaign, from past administrations, and 
with personal connections to the President. The results have shown that Assistants 
to the President from past administrations and with relationships do matter while 
there is not enough evidence to suggest such a relationship in those from the 
campaign. Those from past administrations have a positive influence while those 
with personal connections have a negative influence.
VI. Conclusions
 The background of people chosen for Presidential Assistants is more 
than important to the later success of that President. This staffing influence can 
be witnessed historically and this paper has finally yielded empirical data on the 
subject. A great amount of literature exists on the topic but only insofar as it assumes 
conclusions without ever testing them. The reorganization of the Executive Office 
of the President under the Nixon administration led many political writers to 
examine the effect of staffers on the President’s administration. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the universal conclusion was that the President should choose staffers with 
prior experience while avoiding those people from the campaign and those with a 
close personal repertoire with the President. While those positions were logically 
argued, they were never empirically argued.
 This paper aimed to test that hypothesis and add reasonable credibility to 
the previous literature. Using the prior models of presidential success as a function 
of legislative success in roll call votes, this paper tested the effect of Assistants to 
the President on that success. The effect of Assistants to the President was tested 
using three different characteristics: the percentage of the staff in each year that 
came from the campaign, the percentage that had a personal relationship with 
the President, and the percentage that had worked in a previous administration. 
Controls were then added to account for presidential public approval and the 
majority party in the House of Representatives.
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 After correcting for autocorrelation in the time series and using entity-
demeaned OLS to account for the immeasurable differences brought by different 
administrations, I found that the type of staff chosen is significantly correlated 
with presidential legislative success. The percentage of staff that had experience 
from prior administrations is statistically significant and positively correlated. 
The percentage of staff that had a relationship with the President is statistically 
significant and negatively correlated. The percentage of the staff from the 
campaign is negatively correlated but the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
These results are aligned with the previous speculative literature and the control 
variables are aligned with previous studies on their respective influence.
 A further study could, as done by Rivers and Rose (1985), could examine 
the effect of staff on the passing of individual roll call bills in the same time 
period – 1974 to 2008 – to test their effects. This paper performed a regression on 
the annual averages of public approval and staff percentages but individual bills 
could be regressed in a snapshot of time, so as to confound the results with annual 
averages. This study could also test for the differences of Assistant influence for 
different bills – be it domestic, economic or foreign affairs. By differentiating 
presidential legislative success into those three categories, we could get a much 
more specific depiction of Assistant influence.
 This paper’s findings are significant for media pundits, political advisors 
and Presidents in the choosing of their staff. While a President may want to choose 
those from the campaign or personal friends, this research suggests that they could 
be a detriment to his legislative agenda. A President should look for experience. On 
the same token, pundits and advisors can evaluate a President based on the staff he 
has chosen and be able to cite these findings as evidence rather than using the mere 
speculation of the past literature. Of course, this study alone should not be the only 
criterion that a President uses. This statistical evaluation should just another tool.
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Appendix
Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels
Year P (% P) R (% R) C (% C) Total Assistants
1974 5 (50) 3 (30) 0 (0) 10
1975 2 (22) 3 (33) 0 (0) 9
1976 0 (0) 2 (22) 0 (0) 9
1977 2 (25) 5 (63) 7 (88) 8
1978 1 (11) 5 (55) 9 (100) 9
1979 1 (10) 4 (40) 9 (90) 10
1980 1 (11) 4 (44) 6 (67) 9
1981 7 (54) 2 (15) 10 (77) 13
1982 3 (20) 6 (40) 8 (53) 15
1983 3 (18) 6 (35) 6 (35) 17
1984 4 (25) 4 (25) 6 (38) 16
1985 5 (55) 2 (22) 3 (33) 9
1986 4 (33) 0 (0) 3 (25) 12
1987 2 (15) 0 (0) 3 (23) 13
1988 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (21) 21
1989 12 (92) 2 (15) 2 (15) 13
1990 12 (86) 3 (21) 3 (21) 14
1991 11 (73) 3 (20) 3 (20) 15
1992 9 (56) 1 (06) 5 (75) 16
1993 1 (08) 4 (33) 7 (58) 12
1994 2 (09) 6 (26) 13 (57) 23
1995 2 (08) 5 (20) 12 (48) 25
1996 2 (09) 6 (26) 9 (39) 23
1997 0 (0) 6 (23) 15 (58) 26
1998 0 (0) 7 (27) 16 (62) 26
1999 0 (0) 4 (15) 12 (44) 27
2000 0 (0) 4 (16) 12 (48) 25
2001 3 (18) 10 (59) 8 (47) 17
2002 3 (18) 7 (41) 10 (59) 17
2003 3 (23) 5 (38) 6 (46) 13
2004 3 (21) 6 (43) 6 (43) 14
2005 2 (13) 3 (19) 7 (44) 16
2006 2 (13) 2 (13) 7 (44) 16
2007 3 (18) 2 (12) 7 (41) 17
2008 2 (12) 0 (0) 6 (35) 17
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Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives
Year SucRate
1974
59.3
1975
50.6
1976
43.1
1977
74.7
1978
69.6
1979
71.7
1980
76.9
1981
72.4
1982
55.8
1983
47.6
1984
52.2
1985
45
1986
33.3
1987
33.3
1988
32.7
1989
50
1990
32.4
1991
43.2
1992
37.1
1993
87.3
1994
87.2
1995
26.3
1996
53.2
1997
38.7
1998
36.6
1999
35.4
2000
49.3
2001
83.7
2002
82.5
2003
87.3
2004
70.6
2005
78.3
2006
85
2007
15.4
2008
33.8
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The Rise of American Industrial and Financial Corporations
Elizabeth Laughlin
Abstract
This paper identifies and analyzes the steps the United States took in its progression 
to an industrial nation. Launched by the merger movement in the late nineteenth 
century, vertical and horizontal integration lead to trusts and monopolies in a 
number of industries. Simultaneously, the labor market was undergoing a number 
of reforms with the deskilling of workers. The rise of big business was made 
possible through the growth of the financial sectors and companies such as 
J.P Morgan. The case study of The Standard Oil Co. highlights the wealth and 
power that robber barons such as J.D. Rockefeller held during this time period 
and its continuing affects, including a widening of the distribution of wealth and 
inequality. 
I. Introduction 
 In the nineteenth century, the American economy underwent a period 
of rapid expansion and change as a previously agricultural nation shifted into 
an industrial one. Following the Civil War, there was an accumulation surge due 
to new technological advances and managerial reforms that allowed for greater 
control over workers, price, and output. Mass production of goods soared, as 
well as a shift that occurred in the labor markets, moving from proletarianization 
into homogenization. The rise of big business and corporate finance occurred 
simultaneously and in turn, stimulated the economic growth at the time. This 
growth, however, was concentrated in the monopolistic fortunes of the robber 
barons. While a great deal of innovation and progress was seen with the rise of 
the American industrial and financial markets, it also left the nation with rising 
inequality and wage gaps that are still seen today. 
II. The Merger Movement
 While the majority of businesses industrialized in the 1870s, one industry 
was ahead of its competitors. According to Alfred Chandler, author of The Visible 
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977), America’s first 
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big business appeared in the 1850s with the railway system. At the time, only 
major governmental organizations, such as the United States Post Office, were 
employing more workers and controlling more money than the railroads. Chandler 
further explains, “The great railway systems were by the 1890s the largest 
business enterprises in the United States but also in the world… The railroad was, 
therefore, in every way the pioneer in modern business administration” (1977, p. 
204).
 The change that the American railroads underwent forecasted what was 
to come for the rest of American business. Expanding to unprecedented levels in 
the 1850s, the railroads were responsible for 15 percent of gross private investment 
in the economy during that period, increasing to 28 percent by the 1890s (DuBoff, 
1989). Richard Tedlow, author of The Rise of the American Business Corporation 
(1991), explains, “… the railroad was critical to American economic growth, and 
the corporate form was critical to the growth of the railroad” (p. 15). This corporate 
form that allowed for railroads to expand into big business was facilitated through 
a surge of consolidations. Successful companies, such as W. H. Vanderbilt’s New 
York Central Railroad, began to buy, lease, or form trusts with competitors and led 
to industrial giants, not only within the railroad sector but extending throughout 
all industries (DuBoff, 1989).
 The consolidation movement was discussed above with respect to the 
railroad system, however, the merger movement occurred throughout all industries 
in the late nineteenth century. According to DuBoff, “… all those forces making 
for big business coalesced in a tidal wave of mergers and consolidations” (1989, 
p. 57), focusing largely on Alfred Chandler’s views on the managerial revolution 
and technology as those main forces. Chandler believes that big business was a 
result of inefficiency faced by many industries in the wake of expanding markets 
and new technology (1977). In order to combat this inefficiency, Chandler asserts 
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that the “visible hand” of management allowed for greater control and supervision 
of employees and output. In his book, The Visible Hand, he explains,
 In many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced 
what Adam  Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces. The 
market remained the generator of demand for goods and services, but the 
modern business through existing  processes of production and distribution, 
and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution. 
As modern business enterprise acquired functions hitherto carried out by the 
market, it became the most powerful institution in the American  economy 
and its managers the most influential group of economic decision makers 
(Chandler, 1977, p. 1).
Chandler’s argument rests on the belief that progress and innovation with respect 
to production and larger markets allowed for this change in management (1977). 
Prior to the industrial revolution, corporations simply did not operate at such a 
level that they demanded hierarchical administrators. However, once the markets 
for goods and services expanded, this control over production and workers was 
required. Corporations could no longer depend on market control to ensure its 
efficiency. Instead, firms began to account for external market expansion and 
grow internally through horizontal and vertical integration (ibid).
 The merger movement saw a great deal of horizontal integration, as one 
organization combined with its less successful competition to turn themselves into 
large multi-unit companies. Within horizontally integrated businesses, managerial 
power existed over the various departments, each with their own head (DuBoff, 
1989). By acquiring the competition, these large-scale companies were able to 
control prices and output over the entire market, as if it was a true monopoly 
(Cashman, 1984).
 As horizontal integration allowed for a greater distribution of power, 
vertical integration involves a top-to-bottom accumulation of power. Vertical 
integration allowed for greater production efficiency due to its ability to reduce 
costs (Cashman, 1984). Chandler explicates that the first successful big businesses 
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in the United States were those that implemented a higher level of management, 
responsible for connecting the production and the distribution of goods. In 
many firms, the corporate manager facilitated “the flow from the suppliers of 
raw materials through all the processes of production and distribution to the 
retailer or ultimate consumer” (Chandler, 283). Whether horizontally or vertically 
integrated, the internalization of management led to lowered transaction costs, 
increased production and more competitive prices (ibid.).
 Innovations such as horizontal and vertical innovation cause the Gilded 
Age to often be remembered as a time of continuous prosperity and growth. 
However, in many industries, such as oil and steel, this is not the case (Cashman, 
1984). Demand was always changing while excess capacity was a constant fixture 
since 1873. Accumulation can only continue as long as capacity does not outstrip 
demand, a problem that is often inherent to a capitalist economy, causing firms 
to grow too large for their own markets, forcing companies to drop their prices in 
order to produce some profits. Eventually, the entire market must drop their prices 
as well. This cycle is known as destructive competition (DuBoff, 1989).
 This problem of destructive competition was rampant in the late 1800s, 
leaving many firms in a trapped, diminishing market. In hopes of combating 
destructive competition, corporations sought to establish greater control over 
production, prices, and profits through a number of agreements. Informal 
agreements such as gentlemen’s agreements quickly lead to cartels and eventually, 
trusts. Since trusts did not require a state charter, larger corporations were able to 
force smaller firms to secede control, simply issuing trust agreements entitling 
them to a percentage of profits (Prechel, 2000). As seen with the Standard Oil 
Company, trusts were formed between firms to maximize control and expansion, 
with hopes of eventually monopolizing. The Standard Oil Trust established by 
Rockefeller gave trustees control of more than 90% of the oil industry. Growing 
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wary of the power and size of companies such as Standard Oil, the federal 
government implemented the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 in order to restrict 
monopolies (ibid.). However, the Standard Oil Company, along with a handful of 
other trusts of the period, survived as either a monopoly or oligopoly within their 
respective industries well into the twentieth century (DuBoff, 1989).
 The holding company of the late nineteenth century was critical in the 
development of the modern corporation, providing the foundation for growth. 
Harland Prechel’s book Big Business and the State focuses on the rise of 
corporations and their legacy between the 1880s and the 1990s. However, he 
addresses that the expansion of business corporations began as early as the first 
half of the nineteenth century due to factors such as an increase in foreign demand 
markets following the Napoleonic Wars and the introduction of canal and railway 
transportation. He explains, “As the number of business enterprises increased, the 
demand for business charters (i.e., certificates of incorporation) increased. These 
charters focused on corporations’ capital structure and attempted to ensure the 
rights of the public, creditors, and shareholders” (Prechel, 2000, p. 26). 
 Working together, forces, such as the managerial revolution, integration, 
and technological advancements, provoked the merger movement of the late 
nineteenth century. As described above with respect to the railroad companies, 
a wave of consolidations overtook many industries during this time period. 
According to DuBoff, over 2,653 large-scale businesses vanished in just four 
years, from 1898 until 1902 (1989). A capitalist economy inspires natural 
competition within industries, which comes with gains and losses. As the century 
wore on, competition within industries steepened as new technologies and labor 
processes were introduced, forcing holding companies to merge with their more 
efficient competitors, leading to industry monopolies and the rise of big business 
(ibid.). 
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 For the robber barons of the Gilded Age, the merger movement was 
clearly beneficial as they gained greater market control. However, Chandler 
argues that such mergers were rarely profitable until a middle management was 
added (Chandler, 1977). Their prime responsibility was to plan and oversee the 
increased number of operations within the newly merged company. Capitalists 
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt or Andrew Carnegie remained as figureheads for 
the company, but the day-to-day operations were left to a new level of middle 
management. This development of the multidivisional structure essentially ended 
entrepreneurial capitalism, while this new branch of management that resulted 
from labor reform reshaped production and distribution processes, ensuring the 
dominance of their company (Chandler, 1977).
III. Labor Reform
 While companies were changing due to external markets, innovation 
was also needed within the organization. Much of Chandler’s argument on the rise 
of big business as discussed above relies on correcting the inefficient management 
and labor techniques. Vertical and horizontal integration led to new managerial 
hierarchy, which in turn created greater control and less autonomy for workers. 
These managers, however, were the ones responsible for the shift within the labor 
markets in the 1870s. During proletarianization, skilled workers and artisans held 
a great deal of power over the organization. Attempts by management to cut costs 
by reducing wages were unsuccessful because of this bargaining power. In order 
to combat this and return the power to the executives, many corporations turned 
to technology (Gordon et. al, 1982).
 The introduction of technology during the late nineteenth century helped 
to increase short-run efficiency of production by lowering costs and increasing 
output. However, this was not its primary goal. New technologies were introduced 
because it lessened the dependence on skilled labor for administrators. At the 
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time, “… workers were being transformed into appendages of machinery itself, 
which was assuming almost-human attributes as it ‘takes the place of a mere 
implement’” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 37). This magnifies the division of labor that 
occurred within the homogenization of the 1870s. Technology helped to deskill 
the labor, which in turn lessened workers’ bargaining power, restoring it to the 
hierarchical management. 
 Similar to how investment led to greater market instability, 
homogenization led to great labor instability. Employers adopted a divide-and-
conquer strategy within the workplace to encourage competition between workers 
and weaken their unity. Through vertical and horizontal integration, employers 
sought to divide workers through task variability and new job ladders (Gordon 
et. al, 1982). While unions were productive outlets for negotiations within 
proletarianization, technology made unionization and bargaining power obsolete. 
This had a direct result on the workforce, in which “… the union’s prime weapon, 
the ability to withhold the worker’s labor at peak spring production rushes, had 
declined because the introduction of machinery made the molders’ skill obsolete” 
(Gordon et al., 1982, p. 116). 
 The wave of immigration that occurred in the United States from 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century furthered homogenization. With 
various unskilled, ethnically diverse workers flooding American industrial 
cities, employers found their ideal work group. Manipulating ethnic differences, 
mangers forestalled assimilation into the workplace and amongst employees. 
Large industrial firms quickly realized that by exacerbating ethnic and cultural 
divides they could successfully fracture unionization. Without unions to bargain 
wages and hours, the labor force essentially lost its control over its employers and 
was replaced by a culturally divided and unassimilated set of unskilled workers 
(Gordon et. al., 1982).
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 As mentioned above, the wave of consolidations simultaneously led to 
the development of a new level of administration in the form of middle managers. 
While the emergence of financial corporation facilitated a great portion of mergers, 
many industrial corporations grew large enough to require middle managers. 
Responsible for the day-by-day production, these men oversaw market expansion 
by inventing new techniques to increase production and distribution. For those 
firms in an oligopolistic market, they also sought to destroy their competition. At 
this level, competition was occurring at each stage of production. Therefore, “the 
success of a firm depended primarily on the caliber of its managerial hierarchy. 
Such quality in turn reflected the ability of the top executives to select and evaluate 
their middle managers, to coordinate their work, and to plan and allocate resources 
for the enterprises as a whole” (Chandler, 1977, p. 413). It is clear for one to see 
how the not only the rise of middle managers, but also homogenization, shifted 
the labor power from the workers themselves to the executive management. 
 As worker control enlarged in the latter part of the century, cost controls 
were similarly increasing. The implementation of product cost accounting, which 
measured a firm’s cost of materials, labor, and overhead, left capitalists with the 
proper information to evaluate and minimize production costs (Prechel, 2000). 
More specifically, as quoted by Prechel, “…(1) it compared total product costs 
to market prices for each product, and (2) it directed mangers’ attention toward 
shop-floor activities to identify and reduce production costs” (Prechel, 2000, p. 
97). Although these changes were occurring in the early nineteenth century, the 
expansion of industry and the managerial revolution furthered the importance of 
product cost accounting and laid the foundation for corporate finance (ibid).
IV. The Rise of the Financial Markets
 It is clear to see the influence that the railroads had, especially with 
respect to investment. Investment quickly became the driving force of economic 
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expansion. DuBoff explains, “… capitalism was evolving toward a strong 
dependence on private autonomous investment as the prime mover of the 
economy and investment was becoming the engine of growth and instability” 
(1989, p. 42). The amount of capital witnessed in the latter nineteenth century 
was unprecedented. While the accounting procedures in place at many large 
corporations were effective in the early stages, production soon grew to be managed 
without formal financial guidance (Prechel, 2000). Private investment banks and 
the stock market became the primary resources that facilitated the role (ibid). In 
his book Socializing Capital, William G. Roy focuses of the reflexivity within the 
relationship between the growth of industry and financial capital markets. Citing 
what many economists refer to as American’s first big business, the railroads, 
he highlights how the establishment of railroad corporations was facilitated by 
increased capital availability through loans, while the growth of the railroad 
corporations simultaneously furthered growth within financial institutional 
structures (Roy, 1997). Hugh Rockoff’s paper entitled “Great Fortunes of the 
Gilded Age” specifically focuses on the returns that many capitalists experienced 
during this age of expansion. He remarks, “an investment in the stock market at 
the start of the Gilded Age would have increased, on average, by a factor of nine 
by the end of the era” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 18) Essentially, these structures became 
the proponents of their own expansion and of the financial markets.
 The railroad industry not only pioneered the merger movement, but it 
was also the contributed greatly to the emergence the financial markets, especially 
with respect to its bonds and stock issues. “The stocks and bonds of railroads 
all over the country began to be listed and actively traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange as the capital of investors in this country and in Europe was 
mobilized in support of railways” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 62). The railroad industry’s 
exponential growth caused financial institutions such as investment banks to 
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begin underwriting and mobilizing financial funds, as well as contributing their 
own capital. The financial market aided in stabilizing destructive competition, a 
major concern as discussed above, by overseeing corporate consolidations that 
enabled firms to have control over prices once again (ibid).
 In this time, a direct connection between American industry and 
investment banks was forming. Banks were expanding outside their commercial 
limits, including investment banking and stock ownership. The greatest example of 
this blending between industry and finance can be seen in J. P. Morgan’s financial 
empire. Morgan was the premier banker during the railroad consolidations, 
including control over establishing the trust of Vanderbilt’s New York Central 
Railroad. Morgan, furthermore, serviced the federal government and in the 
1890s, a number of prominent life insurance companies, the largest net buyers 
of corporate securities at the time. While facilitating the trusts within industries 
such as the railroads, Morgan was simultaneously building his own “money trust” 
during the evolution of financial markets (DuBoff, 1989). 
V. The Great Robber Baron Fortune
 As monopolies and oligopolies became more staple of the American 
capitalist economy at the end of the nineteenth centuries, the industrial leaders 
who controlled these companies were simultaneously becoming more prevalent in 
society. Their mass wealth and influence created a shift toward plutocracy (Cashman, 
1984). John Reagan, a congressman from Texas at the time, furthers this by saying, 
“There were no beggars till Vanderbilts and Stewarts and Goulds and Scotts and 
Huntingtons and Fisks shaped the action of Congress and molded the purposed of 
government. Then the few became fabulously rich, the many wretchedly poor… and 
the poorer we are the poorer they would make us” (Cashman, 1984, p. 51). While 
these robber barons were reaping the rewards of the rise of big business, the general 
American was suffering due to many of the reforms explained during labor reform, 
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in turn producing rising inequality (Rockoff, 2008). Relying on a macroeconomic 
framework, Rockoff’s concluding argument within his paper “Great Fortunes of the 
Gilded Age” rests on four factors of the economy that allowed entrepreneurs of the 
late nineteenth century to amass such wealth.
 The first, relying on Chandler’s argument on the necessity for firms for 
vertically integrated, explains how while the introduction of new technology 
allowed for short-run efficiency and lower costs for management, there was also 
a great deal of exploitation by the robber barons that led to their accumulation of 
wealth. He explains, “It often took… ruthless ambition and a willingness to break 
moral and legal constraints to succeed in exploiting the advantages created by 
new manufacturing technology” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 27). This quote mirrors one 
earlier discussed by DuBoff with respect to the Standard Oil Company’s relentless 
expansion (DuBoff, 1989).
 The argument continues to state that the economy of the Gilded Age 
was favorable to robber barons, specifically in terms of property rights and taxes. 
The property laws of the time were strongly protected, therefore allowing one 
to purchase and develop land across the country or even foreign investors from 
owning land in the United States. This increased capital flow from overseas 
simultaneously increased the amount of American millionaires. Perhaps the 
influential factor that allowed for the robber barons to amass so much fortune 
was the lack of federal income tax. The income tax that was enacted during the 
Civil War dissolved in 1872 and did not return until 1913. By this time, the ability 
to reinvest all returns earned during investments without the any loss due to 
taxes greatly impacted their savings and ultimately, led to the widening income 
distribution that Rockoff uses as his last point (Rockoff, 2008).
 Not only did the lack of an income tax allow for rising income inequality 
but further, a shift from an agrarian economy to one of industry also impacts the 
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distribution of wealth.  Rockoff argues that the urbanization that is a direct result 
of the industrial revolution produced increasingly skewed wealth.  He is quoted 
as saying, “In our list of millionaires, we can see a particularly straight channel 
from urbanization to wealth inequality” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 28).  Therefore, one 
can plainly see how the industrial robber barons of the late nineteenth century 
produced inequalities that our economy still battles today.
VI. The Standard Oil Company: A Case Study
 Thus far, this paper has sought to examine transformation of industry 
from family-oriented firms to large-scale monopolies and oligopolies, in which 
robber barons controlled their own respective industry as well as the majority of 
wealth and governmental power. One specific example of this is The Standard 
Oil Company, a predominant oil refining company under the control of John D. 
Rockefeller. DuBoff describes the company as one that “… became the image 
of relentless expansion by any means it took to discipline an unruly industry and 
achieve satisfactory control over prices and output” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 48). The 
question of this case study becomes how did Rockefeller transform his company 
into one of the most successful trusts of its time?
 John D. Rockefeller’s began his entrepreneurial career in oil production 
the 1860s. According to Cashman, he achieved success through four stages. “Initial 
establishment of his own companies between 1862 and 1870; manipulation of 
transportation for his own advantage; ruthless elimination of competition; and an 
interlocking trust to unify his empire” (Cashman, 1984, p. 54). This empire first 
began in Cleveland, Ohio, but would expand to include refineries in Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and New York (Tedlow, 1991). Following fellow robber baron 
Andrew Carnegie’s philosophy to “put all your good eggs in one basket and 
then watch that basket”, Rockefeller made large-scale investments through the 
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growing financial markets that allowed him to gain economies of scale in which 
he constructed his monopoly (ibid.). 
 Establishing a new partnership with Henry M. Flager, increased capital 
pushed further expansion into the Standard Oil Company. The official formation 
of the Standard Oil Trust occurred in January of 1882. Unlike with a cartel or trade 
association, the trust allowed Rockefeller and his subordinates to control multiple 
subsidiaries across the country (Chandler, 1977). In 1866, a second refinery was 
constructed in Cleveland and by 1869, the company was producing 1,500 barrels 
of oil per day, triple what they produced just four years prior (Tedlow, 1991). 
The sheer size and skill of Rockefeller’s refineries forced the unit cost to drop. 
“This relationship of scale to costs has remained central to the structure of the oil 
industry from that date to this. Thus, because Rockefeller’s Cleveland refinery 
complex had become the largest in the industry, it also became its low-cost 
producer,” Chandler explains (Tedlow, 1991, p. 34). 
 While unit costs may have plummeted, transportation costs were still 
increasing, reaching $2.00 per barrel of oil from Cleveland to New York in 1870. 
Rockefeller, however, was able to negotiate a 35% decrease in rates to $1.30 per 
barrel in exchange for supplying 60 carloads of kerosene per day (Tedlow, 1991). 
As discussed above with respect to the growth of financial markets, the use of 
accounting procedures allowed Rockefeller to closely monitor his production and 
distribution costs and in turn, lower them (Chandler, 1977). The railroads had 
grown just as dependent on the oil industry as the oil industry was on the railroads. 
With such low costs and high output, Rockefeller quickly conquered the Cleveland 
market and expanded into other refineries. Already controlling transportation, he 
sought to gain control over his competitors and supplies through the Standard Oil 
“alliance”, trading Standard Oil stock for the assets of the competing firm. By 
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1880, there were 40 firms in the alliance and Standard Oil was controlling more 
than 90% of the market (Tedlow, 1991).
 Rockefeller’s foresight into the future had not only led the company 
to domestic domination, but furthermore, internationally. Rockefeller had 
international ambitions since the beginning of his company. By 1888, these 
ambitions were becoming reality as the company introduced a fleet of company-
owned steam tankers in the Atlantic. Subsidiaries, whether wholly or partially 
owned, were established throughout Europe by the 1890s, allowing for domination 
of the oil industry well into the 1920s (Tedlow, 1991).
 The success of The Standard Oil Company rested in John D. Rockefeller’s 
ability to read his competition and inefficiency. Constantly improving his own 
firm, Rockefeller was closing smaller, inefficient refineries in favor of building 
larger, more productive ones into the turn of the century (Tedlow, 1991). His 
rationalization of production allowed him to gain economies of scale, lower unit 
costs, and eventually, reap the profits. Other attributes such as a steady supply 
of raw materials, and investment in technology and research and development, 
allowed Rockefeller, and so many of his capitalist peers, to transform an unknown 
company, in which he contributed $2,000 of capital, into a multi-million dollar 
global monopoly (Tedlow, 1991). 
XII. Conclusion
 The expansion that occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
transgressed not only within the industrial sector, but also into the labor and 
financial markets. Large-scale manufacturing due to new technological advances 
led to a wave of consolidations and hierarchical management reform, leaving the 
most successful firms of the period in a monopolistic and oligopolistic economy 
with unprecedented amounts of capital. Case studies, such as J. P. Morgan and 
the Standard Oil Company, highlight the control of industry, government, and 
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wealth held by these industrial giants. While the innovation seen in The Gilded 
Age resulted in massive growth in output and capital, eventually causing the rise 
of big business and finance, it can also be remembered as a time of a divided 
workforce and rising inequality. 
57
References
Cashman, Sean Dennis (1984) America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of 
Theodore Roosevelt. New York, NY: New York University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D (1977) The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
DuBoff, Richard B. (1989) Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe
Gordon, David M., Edwards, Richard and Reich, Michael (1982) Segmented Work, Divided Workers: 
The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Prechel, Harland (2000) Big Business and the State: Historical Transitions and Corporate 
Transformation, 1880s-1990s. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Rockoff, Hugh (2008) “Great Fortunes of the Gilded Age.” NBER Working Paper 14555. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Roy, William G. (1997) Socializing Capital. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tedlow, Richard S. (1991) The Rise of the American Business Corporation. New York, NY: 
Harwood Academic Publishers.
58
Japan as a Clean Energy Leader
Stefan N. Norbom
Abstract
Over the past several decades, Japan’s energy strategy had positioned it as the 
world’s leader in clean and efficient electricity production and usage.  This 
strategy, heavily dependent on nuclear energy, was essentially destroyed by one 
of history’s largest earthquakes, followed by a tsunami which overwhelmed five 
nuclear reactors on March 11, 2011.  As of April 2012, all of Japan’s 54 nuclear 
reactors have been shut down and it is uncertain when and how many may be 
restarted.  This paper examines Japan’s options for crafting a new way forward 
with an energy policy to power the world’s third largest economy while taking 
into account the lack of domestic sources of fuel, high government debt, anti-
nuclear sentiments and looming power shortages.
Introduction
 Japan’s position as the clear leader in the area of clean energy has 
been threatened by the earthquake, tsunami and resulting nuclear disaster at the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant.  Japan needs to completely reevaluate its national 
energy strategy but this does not mean that Japan has to abandon its position a 
clean energy leader.  
 Over the past several decades, Japan has been a distinct leader in the area of 
clean and efficient energy.  A Forbes special report published in 2008 listed countries 
leading in energy efficiency and the reasons why. Japan was #1 with energy (measured 
in BTUs per dollar of GDP) two-times more efficient than the US, more than 7 times 
efficient than China and 30 times more efficient than the Ukraine1 
In general, much of this efficiency is driven by a country’s stage of development 
and its access to fuel. Countries that are highly developed generally have higher 
technology and place more emphasis on productivity and quality of life than 
countries that are still pursuing quantum growth at any cost. Japan is highly 
1  Zumbrun, Joshua. “The Most Energy-Efficient Countries.” Information for the World’s Business 
Leaders - Forbes.com. 07 July 2008. Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/03/
energy-efficiency-japan-biz-energy_cx_jz_0707efficiency_countries_slide_2.html>.
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developed but has almost no domestic sources of fossil fuel, so it uses these 
precious imported resources as efficiently as possible. This is not only because 
of the cost of importing fuel, but also in the interests of economic security, in that 
more dependency on importing fuel, the greater the risk of external factors and 
other countries controlling the direction of the economy.
 Another indication of Japan’s leadership position in clean energy is 
their leading role in the development and adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on 
global warming, adopted December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan.  The UNFCCC is 
an international environmental treaty targeting the “stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”  As of September 2011, 191 
states had signed and ratified the protocol, with the US being the only country to 
have signed but not yet ratified.2 
 With its focus on energy security, Japan’s energy policy was highly 
dependent on nuclear as a source.  Figure 1 shows how nuclear has become 
increasingly important to Japan’s energy strategy.  Starting in the 1960’s, Japan 
installed nuclear reactors that supplied close to one-quarter of its electricity supply 
by 2004, and nearly 30% by early 2011 from 54 reactors in operation.3  
2  Kyoto Protocol. (2010). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather guide. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/heliconhe/kyoto_protocol
3  Cleveland, Cutler. “Energy Profile of Japan.” Encyclopedia of Earth. 23 Apr. 2010. Web. 09 Dec. 
2011. <http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Japan>.
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Figure 1:  Japan’s electricity sources 1984-2004
Furthermore, Japan’s energy policy was set to grow its dependence on nuclear 
energy to more than 50% of its supply by 20304. What could be better than clean 
energy with a virtually unlimited supply of fuel?
A drastic change of plan
At 2:46PM on Friday, March 11, 2011, the most powerful known 
earthquake to have ever hit Japan struck off its East coast.  The earthquake had 
a magnitude of 9.05, and triggered a disastrous tsunami, with waves reaching 
heights of more than 40 meters (~130 feet) in the city of Miyako, in Tohoku’s 
Iwate Prefecture.  The earthquake knocked out the direct electricity supply to the 
cooling system of the Fukushima reactor, however backup power supplies were 
in place in the form of diesel generators and batteries. Then the tsunami struck the 
Fukushima plant with a wave more than twice the height of what the plant had 
been designed to handle.  The two alternate sources of power were knocked out 
4  Drysdale, Peter. “Japan’s Energy Options after Fukushima.” East Asia Forum. 5 Sept. 2011. 
Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-options-after-
fukushima/>.
5  Fackler, Martin. “Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan.” The New York TImes. 
11 Mar. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12japan.
html?pagewanted=all>.
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and the cooling systems failed. No one could have anticipated or even imagined 
the triple disaster of March 2011 -- an earthquake, tsunami and a nuclear accident. 
Without cooling, the most daunting of the problems facing Japan 
became containment after partial meltdowns in three reactors6.  Radiation levels 
skyrocketed to 400 times the normal level. More than 200,000 people were 
evacuated from the surrounding areas. While still recovering from the severe loss 
of life and infrastructure, the events of March 11 forced Japan to begin evaluating 
options for a new energy strategy.  Whereas Japan had considered atomic nuclear 
energy as the most promising path to a future with clean energy, a September 2011 
poll by Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun shockingly concluded that 74% of Japanese 
wanted to gradually phase out nuclear power completely. Following the crisis, 
former Prime Minister Kan announced future plans for a bottom-up review of 
the country’s nuclear-focused Basic Energy Plan. Authored by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in collaboration with private power utilities, 
the plan announced the construction of fourteen additional nuclear power plants 
by 2030. Now Japan is forming a new national energy policy plan and is currently 
at a crossroads: should the country continue with their nuclear-centered plans 
based on economic security, or should Japan pursue another energy plan that may 
present a more acceptable path for its people?  
Considerations of the new strategy
 As the Japan government considers its strategy, there are several elements 
that need to be kept in mind and balanced:
Cost – What is the upfront investment and on-going costs give Japan’s government 
debt already reached 220% of GDP?7 
6  CNN Wire Staff. “3 Nuclear Reactors Melted down after Quake, Japan Confirms - CNN.” 
Featured Articles from CNN. 06 June 2011. Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-
06-06/world/japan.nuclear.meltdown_1_nuclear-reactors-fuel-rods-tokyo-electric-power?_
s=PM:WORLD>.
7  “List of Sovereign States by Public Debt.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. 6 Dec. 2011. Web. 
09 Dec. 2011. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_by_public_debt>.
62
Speed of implementation – How soon can this be implemented in a significant way?
Long-term potential – How soon can alternatives be implemented and what is the 
ultimate potential that an electricity source can provide.
Energy security – Does this fit Japan’s goal of being economically secure with its 
energy sources?
Cleanliness – Does it meet Japan’s goal of clean energy?
Acceptance – Will the public accept the solution?
The strategic investment options can be viewed as follows with a high level 
assessment (R being bad, Y being challenging, G being good) of each alternative 
based on the above factors.  Also noted is the supply situation as of 2009, which 
shows the heavy reliance on nuclear and fossil (oil, LNG and coal):8
Strategic Assessment (2009) 
Generation Supply Cost Speed LT Pot Secure Clean Accept
Nuclear 27% G G G G G R
Fossil 63% G Y G R R Y
Hydro 8% G R R G G G
Renewables <2% R R G G G G
Distribution & 
usage Smart grid - R Y G G G G
Control 
consumption - G G G G G Y
Green use - R Y G G G Y
Table 1: Strategic assessment of energy investment options
It is worthwhile to look at each of these areas to assess the relative 
benefits and negatives to being part of the new Japan energy strategy.
Re-introduction of nuclear energy 
 Today, only eleven of the fifty-four nuclear reactors in Japan are 
operating.  Most of these were not affected by the March events, but have stopped 
operating due to the regulatory requirement for maintenance shut down every 13 
months. To restart after maintenance, not only does the nuclear regulatory agency 
8  “Japan.” Country Analysis Briefs. Mar. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/
Japan/pdf.pdf>.
63
need to give its approval but also the local government.  It is the second half of 
that process that is proving difficult – local government is voted in by the people 
and the majority of people are against nuclear.  If no reactors are restarted, all 54 
will be shut down by April 2012 – 13 months after the events at Fukushima.
 This could put a tremendous strain on Japan’s economy, as it is difficult 
to cope with eliminating 30% of the power supply within such a short period.  As 
we saw in the strategic assessment, there is no way to instantly replace this supply 
shortfall. The only solution would be a reduction in consumption and then, over 
time, fossil fuel sources can be built-up, and renewables in the long run.  
The following is the view of 50 major companies, both Japanese and US, 
that comprise the US-Japan Business Council (USJBC), which met in New York 
on December 1-2, 2011: “Japan has a world-leading nuclear energy industry.   As 
with renewables, nuclear energy offers virtually emissions-free power generation 
and requires no fossil fuel imports.  It accounted for about 30 percent of Japan’s 
power generation capacity prior to the events of March.  The Council recommends 
that Japan promptly re-start nuclear power stations after assuring their safety.  It 
would be unrealistic to expect that other sources of power generation could be 
built rapidly enough to offset a complete elimination of nuclear energy, and the 
costs would be high.  Jobs and economic development should also be considered. 
For Japan’s industry to succeed internationally, it is imperative for the country to 
maintain a strong domestic nuclear energy capability.”9 
 The USJBC view represents a less-emotional, more practical perspective 
given the alternatives available.  Yet the political situation will make this difficult 
to accomplish without a great deal of analysis and debate.
Conventional fossil fuels
 Although Japan’s goal is move towards green technology that utilizes 
9  Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
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renewable resources, conventional fossil fuels cannot be overlooked since it 
would take decades until renewable energy is a viable major source of energy. 
Currently Japan imports a high amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and with 
the recent discovery of unconventional gas reserves through shale, it seems more 
economically efficient and feasible to exploit this opportunity. One issue that 
Japan is currently facing as an importer of gas has to do with the scarcity of gas, 
which allows other countries with reserves to control and drive up the price. With 
the increase in supply of gas by 33%10  (2015), which is due to the discovery 
of unconventional gas reserves, the overall prices of gas should begin declining 
(Refer to Figure 2).  Recently the IEA has predicted that by 2035, unconventional 
gas will account for a staggering 35% of new global energy by 203511.As it 
becomes a more dominant source of energy, incentives will arise to innovate and 
create technology based solution that would mitigate the environmental impacts 
of gas thus making it even more clean. 
 Although coal has drawbacks of environmental pollution through the 
emission of green house gasses, coal currently is a reasonably priced fuel source12. 
Clean coal technology, while expensive, allows industries to capture the carbon 
that would be emitted prior or following the combustion process.  
It is clear that fossil fuels need to be used to some degree, in the short-
term in order to meet Japan’s energy needs. Through innovation, firms will be 
able to minimize the environmental costs of fossil fuel use until renewable energy 
becomes a viable option in the long term. 13
10 Presentation by Department of Energy Representative at USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
11 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
12 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
13 Presentation by Department of Energy Representative at USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
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Hydroelectric power
 Hydroelectric power is clean and secure from an economic point of view, 
thus Japan has fully focused on exploiting this as a source of power and has grown 
capacity to 8% of total.  Unfortunately, Japan has a limited geographic space and 
limited usable rivers and has already harnessed all major sources, so this does not 
represent a viable option for expansion in the future.  
Other renewable energy
 When considering renewable energy other than hydroelectric, 
the main alternatives are wind, solar and geothermal power.  Prior to his 
resignation, Prime Minister Kan announced a bold objective to increase 
the supply of renewable energy from its current contribution of less than 
10% to 20% by the 2020s.  The planning agency of Japan’s economy, 
METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) outlined aggressive 
objectives for both solar and wind power as can be seen in the chart below: 
Figure 2: Recent trends of gas energy 
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Figure 3: Objectives for solar and wind power
Geothermal was essentially considered as having little potential due to cost and, 
again, geographic limitations.
 For any country, having a large supply of electricity from renewable 
resources provides numerous benefits. Specifically, renewable energy can be 
incorporated into Japan’s electricity production strategies while not adding any 
greenhouse gas emissions to the environment. But incorporating renewable 
energy such as solar and wind power is no easy task.  The following are obstacles 
that would need to be addressed: (1) The energy that would be produced from 
solar and wind are determined by the availability of sunlight and wind, therefore 
there is necessary research and development required in order to increase the 
efficiency and stability of these technologies; (2) Policies need to be developed 
to accelerate the onerous approval and review process currently in place in Japan; 
(3) at its current scale and technology, renewable energy is far more expensive 
than conventional fossil fuels, and (4) It takes a great deal of time and effort 
to build sufficient scale to be a significant contributor to the overall capacity. 
Because of these issues, Japan currently generates less than 1% of its power from 
solar and wind power but has committed, nonetheless, to move aggressively in 
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this direction.  One recent positive sign -- the Action Plan to Stabilize Energy 
Demand-Supply was announced on November 1st, 2011, and this plan will address 
the regulations making renewable energy a more viable energy option. 
 In terms of the costs of wind and solar energy, technology has advanced 
at an incredible rate and the cost gap is closing on conventional fossil fuels. 
Some believe that, if the cost of CO2 and other emissions are considered, the cost 
equation is even closer.  As an example, technology has advanced in the wind 
turbine area so that a single wind turbine can support the energy needs of 700 
homes today versus only 420 homes in 2005.14 Similar advances have been made 
in the solar energy area.
 Technology advancements in storage and transmission and management 
can also address the stability of these power sources, but again this will take time. 
While solar and wind can be a major contributor to Japan’s power supply, there will 
need to be other solutions to fill the short and medium term needs of the country.
Distribution and usage control
 One major opportunity for Japan lies in the integration and distribution 
of technology that can control the usage of energy resources, which is further 
enforced by the estimate that only 70% of energy produced actually is productively 
used.15 Through three major improvements, enormous benefits can be captured: 
Japan currently has one grid operating on a 60 Hz and one on a 50 Hz16, one 
supplying the east and one supplying the west. This network connection issue 
is problematic because of the reduction in flexibility if one system experiences 
a power outage. Following the March 11th tsunami and earthquake, the two 
incompatible systems prevented eastern Japan from “borrowing” electricity from 
western Japan.  A second issue is the grid reliability: through developing smarter 
14 USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, December 1-2, 2011
15  USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, December 1-2, 2011
16  Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
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software systems the grid reliability and efficient usage of energy can be greatly 
improved.  As recommended by the USJBC members, the United States and Japan 
should work together and develop a framework that will increase the efficiency of 
the distribution grids, through the integration of information and communication 
technologies into the already existing infrastructure17.  The final improvement 
involves research and development in order to improve energy storage capability. 
Doing so would have three major benefits: (1) Secure supply to critical operations 
and facilities (examples: hospitals, communications, and nuclear power plants). 
(2) Facilitate energy stability management and peak demand. (3) And the 
successful integration of renewable energy into grid18.  Therefore there is also a 
need for innovation in developing superior large size batteries to bring stability to 
the grid systems, particularly to renewables sources that have inherent variability. 
 The Japanese Government successfully established power-saving targets 
to avoid rolling blackouts in various areas of Japan during the peak summer season. 
Major users of electricity cut their consumption by up to 25%, while smaller 
industries reduced electricity consumption by 20%, and household 15-20%19. 
The potential energy efficiency increase could be enormous by incorporating a 
demand side program, which would increase the consumption and distributions 
of energy sources. 
Supply or demand-based solutions – the Nautilus proposal
 The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, located in San 
Francisco, Seoul, and Melbourne have analyzed and suggested that there are 
essentially two approaches to the problem – either central supply control or 
demand and usage control. 
17  Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
18  Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
19  “BBC News - Japan Sets Power-saving Targets to Avoid Blackouts.” BBC. 8 Apr. 2011. Web. 
09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13008846>.
69
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) provides electricity to 
nearly 45 million people or 35% of Japan’s population, while 12 million others 
are served by Tohoku Electric Power Company. Both TEPCO and Tohoku have 
announced power rationing programs, including rolling blackouts in many areas 
not affected by the earthquake and excluding central Tokyo20. Clearly TEPCO 
and Tohoku will struggle to fulfill Japan’s electricity needs in the short term. The 
alternative “Best Case” scenario strategy, as outlined by Nautilus, focuses on the 
inevitable supply shortfall the two electric companies will experience, and which 
is likely to last five years. During this time, the condition of the existing nuclear 
and thermal reactors would be evaluated. The plan would also promote firms and 
individuals to employ “demand-side” alternatives, or energy-efficient and energy-
saving techniques and regulate electrical distribution at the customer site, rather 
than using central power stations21.  This demand-side approach would aim to 
generate excess energy, which could then be distributed through a smart grid that 
can accept power inputs, and re-distribute at a local level. For example, an office 
building could be equipped with a photovoltaic array on the rooftop that helps 
power the building22.  The grid approach would allow intermittent renewable 
energy use to be scaled up, together with an aggressive program promoting 
extremely efficient end-use technologies, as well as energy conservation and 
peak power management23.  This approach is believed to be cheaper, quicker, 
environmentally cleaner, and less risky in the short and long run, than relying on 
susceptible costal thermal or nuclear power plants to fulfill the demand for power. 
20  “See, for example Tohoku Joins Tepco in Rationing Power”, Japan Times, March 16, 2010, 
[retrieved 17 March 2011] <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110316a5.htm>. 
21  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
22  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
23  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
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 The Nautilus report compares two approaches to the issues faced by 
Japan: The first deals with energy efficiency, renewable energy and distributed 
generation (EE/RE/DG) estimated to cost US$11 billion per year.24 The second 
includes central station gas and nuclear plants, estimated at US$10 billion/year.25 
Cost not withstanding, the long and short term benefits of each option provide 
very different results.
 While the EE/RE/DG scenario is more costly in the short-run, over time 
as the program is deployed, it should prove to be a more cost-effective solution 
when taking into account the benefits of an early recovery that would otherwise 
result in unmet electricity demands. In addition, the demand-side management 
program, which would begin in the TEPCO/Tohoku service territories, ramps up so 
quickly that by the second year of the program, it saves 2% of sales annually. The 
program commands quick deployment over the next four years of energy-efficient 
and renewable sources, and consumer-site, gas-fired generation.  Based on initial 
estimates, the program would be able to provide 81 TWh of delivered electricity 
supplies annually after the four-year implementation stage, in addition to 22 GW 
of delivered summer peak power26.  This option would also bring emissions of 
50% less carbon dioxide, which would aid in Japan’s ambitious green house gas 
emission reduction goal, supporting the development of a “green economy.” 
Another benefit is the ease of implementation. Although costly, it would begin 
producing and saving power immediately, in comparison to the central station 
option which would take three years or longer to implement, which would mean 
high costs from unmet electricity demand. While the EE/RE/DG program would 
24  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
25  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
26  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
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cost 14 cents/kWhe, the central station alternative would amount to 12 cent/
kWhe, but considering the uncertainty of the central station alternative, the cost 
would be much higher than 14 cent/kWhe27.  The destruction caused by the March 
disasters means Japan will rebuild a significant amount of infrastructure, at an 
estimated cost of US$310 billion. New infrastructure provides an opportunity to 
supply electricity grids, factories etc. with the most energy-efficient technology, 
incorporating “smart grid” technology28. The benefit of pursuing EE/RE/DG is 
difficult to calculate, but the marginal cost needed to bring improvements could 
create incentives for investment into larger market energy efficiency, demand-
side technologies (such as solar hot water and solar photovoltaic systems) and 
distributed generation in Japan29.  And the estimated total savings from this 
approach would be significant and possibly displace 50 million tons of carbon 
dioxide from thermal power plants.30
A holistic approach with emphasis on demand side control
 At the USJBC Annual Meeting on December 1st and 2nd, it was 
extensively discussed to take a holistic approach by creating an intelligent and 
diverse energy system.31 In doing so it will decrease the risks and costs associated 
with energy supply and production while at the same time making Japan’s energy 
processes more cost-effective and efficient. The common opportunity presented 
in this approach, but more heavily stressed in the Nautilus approach, is the focus 
27  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
28  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
29  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
30  Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact 
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity 
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
31  Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, 
December 1-2, 2011
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on demand side programs, which entail capturing a greater proportion that 30% 
of the electricity wasted through improving the efficiency of existing systems 
while also cutting demand with improved technology, monitoring and controls. 
The practicality, emissions and low costs in comparison to alternative approaches, 
associated with demand side, indicates that greater emphasis should be placed on 
increasing energy efficiency through developing smarter systems.  
The priorities under this approach with an emphasis on demand-side 
efficiencies would be as follows:
•	 Close the short-term supply-demand gap through 1) policies and 
incentives to encourage overall and peak demand reduction; 2) restart the 
newer nuclear reactors located in areas considered safe from earthquakes 
and tsunami risk.
•	 Formulate policies to increase the research and development and 
manufacture of smart grid, energy storage and clean distributed energy 
solutions to reduce the need for energy supply.
•	 Encourage installation of the most efficient gas-generated thermal energy 
systems as these are the cleanest and lowest overall cost (inclusive of 
consideration of emissions) alternatives to nuclear power that can be 
installed within the short term and take advantage of the new supply of 
unconventional gas.
•	 Put in place policies and incentives to encourage the rapid installation 
of renewable energy systems as these will be clean, cost competitive 
solutions in the long term, but need to be started now to be a significant 
part of the solution.
With these priorities in place, Japan can quickly address its energy needs and 
move confidently into the future with a clear path to maintaining its secure energy 
position and role as clean energy leader.
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An Attempt to Reshape Capitalism’s Image
Ross Nichols
Introduction
John Stuart Mill claimed to be a disciple of both Jeremy Bentham and 
David Ricardo.  This was a strange proclamation because each man advocated a 
competing theory of value; Bentham’s utilitarianism laid the foundation for the 
utility theory of value and Ricardo developed the labor theory of value.  Mill’s 
goal in attempting to unify these theories of value was to provide a solution 
for the growing class conflict that plagued capitalism.  Class conflict arose as 
feudalism was phased out and industrial capitalism replaced merchant capitalism 
as the dominant economic system.  The Corn Laws symbolized this competition 
between classes.  Capitalists were against the Corn Laws because the subsequent 
tariffs would lower their rate of profit.  Landowners supported the Corn Laws 
because they increased the rent on land.  Even Karl Marx held spoke out against 
the Corn Laws on behalf of the working class.  Capitalism fostered persistent 
antagonism between classes as each struggled to gain or maintain power; no class 
was immune from this contest.  Class conflict was therefore ubiquitous in capitalist 
society and generated widespread scrutiny and debate over capitalism.  Jeremy 
Bentham and David Ricardo took opposing sides in this debate.  Bentham was 
initially supported it but died a reformist.  Class conflict was resolvable but not 
under the current form of capitalism.  Ricardo’s labor theory of value promoted 
the view that class division occurred naturally in a capitalist society.  And since 
capitalism was the best possible economic system, class division was a necessary 
evil and could not be remedied.  Both Ricardo and Bentham acknowledged 
that class conflict was inherent in capitalism but each treated it differently.  In 
claiming to be a disciple of both men, Mill hoped to show that capitalism could 
exist alongside social harmony.  His goal was to change the nature of capitalism. 
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To achieve this, Mill had to accept both utilitarianism and the labor 
theory of value, and reconcile their differences.  He was ultimately unsuccessful. 
Mill made so many qualifications to both Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s 
labor theory of value that he argued against them.  While Mill did formulate 
a philosophy of utilitarianism, it challenged Benthamite utilitarianism on a 
fundamental level.  Bentham focused on individual utility but Mill was more 
concerned with social utility.  Mill’s split from Ricardo was even more drastic. 
He accepted the labor theory of value, but on the strict condition that the ratios 
of capital to labor were equated across industries.  Mill realized the unlikelihood 
of this ever occurring and promoted a Smithian adding-up theory of value as 
a generally more applicable measure of value.  Thus while he claimed to be a 
disciple of both Bentham and Ricardo, Mill modified their theories to such 
an extent that his own utilitarianism and theory of value were contradictory. 
However, Mill’s attempt at reconciliation should not be viewed in vain.  His was 
the most concerted effort to unite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value.  He 
made the best attempt at reshaping the image of capitalism.  
This paper will begin by discussing the origin of the contrasting theories 
of value in classical political economy.  The first section will describe Adam 
Smith’s unsuccessful search for an invariable measure of value.  An analysis of 
Benthamite utilitarianism and Ricardian labor theory of value will follow.  Each 
theory treats the class conflicts that erupted during this time period differently.  It 
is critical to examine these perspectives because they were the basis for Mill’s 
attempt at reconciliation.  After Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s labor 
theory have been discussed, Mill’s own utilitarianism and theory of value will 
be evaluated.  There were parallels in Mill’s thought that linked him to his idols, 
which will be discussed briefly.  The differences in thought represented his 
attempt at synthesizing the competing notions of value.  These will be studied 
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closely.  During this analysis it becomes clear that Mill betrayed his allegiances 
to both Bentham and Mill and as a result, ultimately failed in his attempt to recast 
capitalism.  This will be addressed in the conclusion.  The conclusion will also 
compare Mill’s hopeful outlook on capitalism with Marx’s critical perspective of 
it.
An Elusive Measure of Value   
The utility and labor theories of value resulted from the inability of Adam 
Smith to find an invariable measure of value.  Despite his attempts to develop a 
theory of prices, Smith was unable to derive a theory in which prices of goods 
were explained by something other than prices.  This led economic thinkers to 
seek out determinants of value that were independent of prices.  Two theories 
arose.  One argued that the amount of labor embodied in a good determined 
value and the other contended that value lay in the utility a good provided. 
Jeremy Bentham was the leading advocate of the subjectivist utility theory of 
value while the objectivist labor theory of value originated with David Ricardo. 
Yet although the foundations of each theory are distinctly different, noticeable 
overlaps formed between the two.  Policy was the most prevalent example of this. 
Many objectivists promoted policies similar those prescribed by Bentham and 
numerous subjectivists endorsed policies comparable those supported by Ricardo. 
John Stuart Mill is the most intriguing example of this overlap.  His social policies 
paralleled Benthamite thinking but his economic policies were analogous to 
Ricardo.  Thus Mill exhibited both Benthamite and Ricardian influences.  While 
two invariable measures of value were found, it did not seem as if the related 
theories of value were mutually exclusive.  
Adam Smith constructed his theory of prices on the argument that 
human labor determined the value of a good.  However, unlike the labor theory 
of value, Smith believed labor determined exchange value only in the “early and 
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rude state of society” (Smith, 1869 [1783], 49).  After a society progressed to a 
capitalist economy, price was determined by wages, rent and profit; an adding up 
theory of value.  Smith contended a labor theory of value no longer held when 
profits were introduced because they had no relation to the labor embodied in a 
commodity (Hunt, 2002, 52).  Smith thus believed that while labor embodied in 
a product still remained proportional to the price of good, it could no longer be 
its sole determinant.  He also posited the notion that value of capital per worker 
varied by industry (Hunt, 2002, 52).  As a result, profits and wages created a price 
disproportionate to the amount labor embodied in the production of a good.  But 
Smith never articulated a method to determine how labor embodied in a good 
influenced its price in this scenario.  
Two critical problems arose from Smith’s theory of prices.  First, in 
stating that prices were determined by wage, rent and profit, Smith derived prices 
from prices. This meant his theory of prices rested on circular reasoning.  Second, 
Smith was able to make inferences about the general price level but he failed to 
mention anything about the relative value of goods.  An implicit consequence 
of Smith explanation of prices in terms of other prices was that if any of the 
cost components rose, the value of that good had to rise as well.  Yet Smith also 
believed that the value of capital per worker varied by industry.  The effect of a 
price increase in a common input would have an effect on the price of a good 
proportional to its dependency on that input in production. Commodity prices 
would thus increase by the different amounts (Hunt, 2002, 55).  These faults 
in Smith’s theory of prices ignited a search for invariable measures of value. 
Bentham argued that the utility of a good determined its worth, Ricardo believed 
the amount of labor embodied in a commodity determined its value.
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Two Solutions to Smith’s Dilemma
Bentham’s utilitarianism is best exemplified in his claim that “nature 
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure” (Bentham, 1823 [1789], 1).  He reasoned that all human behavior 
could be reduced to either seeking out pleasure or avoiding pain.  And since he 
considered humans to be rational, they naturally sought to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain.  Measuring the amount of pleasure or pain an experience generated 
could be reduced to a simple calculation.  For an individual, pleasure and pain 
were measured by an event’s intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity 
and purity; when an action involved multiple people its effect on others was also 
taken into account (Bentham, 1823 [1789], 30).  Propinquity is the nearness in 
time this sensation will be felt.  Fecundity was the likelihood of a pleasurable 
act continuing to generate pleasure.  Purity was the chance this same act would 
not cause pain later.  Actions with a high utility were considered beneficial and 
moral and actions with a low utility were detrimental and immoral.  The interests 
of the community then simply became the aggregate of these individual utilities. 
However, Bentham considered the community a fictitious entity (Manning, 1968, 
17).  It was possible to measure a community’s happiness, but it could not be 
studied apart from the aggregation of individual utility.  Utilitarianism was thus 
focused solely on the individual.  Bentham acknowledged the implicit difficulty 
of individual utility measurements but he feared that without it, people would 
behave irrationally (Manning, 1968, 35).  This confidence in utilitarianism was 
the basis for his theory of value.
Bentham’s utility theory of value was rooted in felicific calculus, which 
he believed was applicable to all aspects of life and included the purchase of 
commodities.  The more pleasure someone derived from a good, the more they 
would be willing to pay for it.  Bentham argued that the value of good was 
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dependent on the likelihood someone had it, the amount of time the owner would 
have it, and the length of time it took the owner to attain the good (Bentham, 1823 
[1789], 32).  This adherence to felicific calculus allowed Bentham to articulate 
a method for determining the price of a good without using other prices.  He 
also came close to defining marginal utility. Once wealth had been accumulated 
beyond the subsistence level, the happiness gleaned from every additional unit 
of decreased.  Eventually people would become indifferent at the prospect of an 
additional unit of wealth.  The utility theory of value became a relevant solution 
to Adam Smith’s problem.  However, Jeremy Bentham was not the only person to 
develop a non-circular theory of value.  
David Ricardo began his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
by conceding that utility was present in all goods but that it also had no influence 
over exchange value.  To highlight his point, Ricardo compared gold and water 
(Ricardo, 1876 [1821], 9).  Gold is much more valuable than water but the latter 
has many more uses he argued.  Price therefore had to be determined by something 
else.  Ricardo believed that scarcity and the labor embodied in the production of a 
good determined its value (Ricardo, 1876 [1821], 9).  And since Ricardo focused 
on everyday commodities, exchange value was determined almost entirely by the 
labor embodied in a good, which was present in several different forms.  Present 
labor was the labor required to produce the final good.  Past labor created the 
intermediate goods and tools used in the production of the final good.  If a good 
required specialized or more educated labor, this was also factored in.  Thus 
Ricardo also developed a theory of value that also avoided Adam Smith’s circular 
reasoning.  Yet while the labor theory of value stood in contrast to the utility 
theory of value, the two men had a strong friendship and Ricardo adhered to a 
philosophy akin to utilitarianism.  
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Cremaschi 2004 argued that Ricardo drew much of his philosophy from 
Thomas Belsham, a minister.  Belsham believed that utility was important on 
a universal scale in order to promote the greatest amount of happiness to the 
greatest amount of people (Belsham, 1801, 432 cited in Cremaschi, 2004, 391). 
Ricardo agreed with this view on utility so he necessarily agreed with Bentham 
in that the principle of utility was needed to determine moral standards.  Where 
Ricardo differed from Bentham was the extent to which this felicific calculus 
could be applied.  He felt it was impossible to compare individual measurements 
of happiness (Cremaschi, 2004, 390).  This is why Ricardo maintained that labor 
was better determinant of value than utility.  Felicific calculus could not work if 
every source of happiness was incomparable to every other source of happiness; 
this applied to commodities as well.  Although Ricardo purported a different 
value theory than Bentham, they agreed that the principle of utility was could 
be used to determine the “greater good”.  The relationship between Ricardo and 
Bentham is thus itself the beginning of the overlap in classical political economy; 
Ricardo accepted the presence of utility in commodities but he did not agree with 
Bentham’s method for determining value.  It was possible to consider one theory 
of value superior while simultaneously advocating policies associated with the 
founder of the opposing theory of value.  
Rational subjectivists such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior and 
Frédéric Bastiat promoted the utility theory of value but their view on policy 
was much more similar to Ricardo than Bentham.  They advocated freedom 
from government intervention and argued for free trade and existing property 
laws.  Although Bentham originally supported laissez faire capitalism, he became 
a reformist and promoted the reallocation of wealth and income, in addition 
to amending property laws.  This reformist attitude was shared by Ricardian 
Socialists like Thomas Hodgskin and William Thompson.  These men favored 
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redistributing wealth from the capitalists to the laborers and giving workers more 
control over the means of production.  While the two theories of value remained 
distinct, they did not govern one’s views on policy.
The fact that proponents of the labor theory of value argued for reform of 
capitalism and that utilitarians contended social harmony already existed hinted at 
a split within classical political economic thought that was deeper than the utility 
and labor theories of value.  Treatment of class conflict was the root cause of the 
schism in classical political economy.  The class that economic thinkers identified 
with dictated how they viewed the struggle between social classes. Jeremy 
Bentham identified with the working class because he believed that social conflict 
was a pressing issue in capitalist societies that could be fixed.  Bentham was not a 
member of the working class but he supported them because he argued that class 
conflict could be resolved.  This was based on his belief that private property was 
a man-made institution (Hunt, 2002, 188).  Ricardo identified with the capitalists 
because he believed that class conflict was inherent in human nature; it was useless 
to attempt to remedy it.  Unlike Bentham, Ricardo argued that the institution of 
private property was natural and eternal (Hunt, 2002, 122).  Thus the main division 
in classical political economy was how economists responded to the presence of 
class conflict.  Those who believed that private property was an ephemeral entity 
believed class conflict could be solved by adopting a more socialistic economic 
system.  Ideology was a key determinant on how one responded to class conflicts 
in capitalism.  The split in classical political economy was thus rooted in the 
differences in the treatment of class conflict.  John Stuart Mill tried to do more 
than simply unite two incompatible theories of value, he wanted to completely 
alter the nature of capitalism.  Mill wanted to show that social harmony could 
exist within a capitalist society.
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Mill the Disciple
That Mill claimed to be a disciple of both Jeremy Bentham and David 
Ricardo should come as no surprise.  Mill’s father was close friends with both 
Bentham and Ricardo, and was an overbearing presence in his son’s life.  Bentham 
clearly influenced the elder Mill beyond their personal relationship, as evidenced 
by the Benthamite principles found in the elder Mill’s writing (Anderson, 2006, 
12).  James Mill also considered himself the “spiritual father” of Ricardo (Bowring, 
1838-43, 10: 498 cited in Cremaschi, 2004, 378).  It was James Mill who first 
formed the potential link between utilitarianism and the labor theory of value that 
his son would attempt to solidify.  John Stuart Mill became indoctrinated in his 
father’s ideas as the elder Mill groomed his son to carry on his work.  John Stuart 
embarked on a rigorous education plan at the behest of his father and by the time 
he was a teenager, the younger Mill had become proficient in Latin, Greek, and 
differential calculus.  Initially, it appeared James Mill had successfully molded 
his son to be his successor, to unite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value.
At first glance, Mill upheld his claim to be a disciple of Bentham.  Mill 
believed that pleasure and the avoidance of pain were the best possible outcomes 
of an event (Mill, 2006 [1861], 68).  Like his predecessor, this led Mill to 
equate utility with the greatest happiness principle and underscore the equality 
of all individual measurements of utility; societal utility depended on the equal 
consideration of the utilities of the entire population (Mill, 2006 [1861], 111).  Mill 
thus paralleled Bentham on two fundamental points.  The basic definition of utility 
for both men rested on the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain.  Also of 
critical significance was the importance placed on measuring individual utility. 
Mill began his own analysis of utilitarianism from a Benthamite perspective.
Mill drew on his allegiance to Ricardo as he constructed his theory of 
value.  In his Principles of Political Economy, he argued something nearly identical 
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to the labor theory of value; that the value of commodities was determined mainly by 
quantity of labor required to produce it (Mill, 1884 [1848], 264).  Mill also promoted 
Say’s Law, which stated that a general glut of commodities was impossible.  He 
believed that whoever brought additional commodities to the market also brought 
an additional increase in purchasing power, which was analogous to an increase in 
demand (Mill, 1884 [1848], 366).  And most importantly, Mill acknowledged the 
critical exception inherent in the labor theory of value: it only held when the ratios 
of capital to labor were equated across industries.  Both men realized that any labor-
based theory of value had to account for this issue.  The influence of David Ricardo 
was evident in the formation of Mill’s own theory of value.    
Yet it soon became clear that John Stuart Mill did not completely agree 
with Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s labor theory of value.  Free from his 
father’s watchful eye after James’s death in 1832, John Stuart began to openly 
criticize Bentham.  He also found fault with the labor theory of value.  Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, published in 1861, and his Principles of Political Economy, 
first published in 1848, were written in order to address what Mill deemed 
shortcomings in the theories of Bentham and Ricardo.  These attempts ultimately 
proved unsuccessful.  Despite his claim to be a disciple of Bentham and Ricardo, 
Mill refuted both Benthamite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value.  
Mill’s Great Endeavor
After James Mill’s death, John Stuart broke free from his father’s 
doctrine.  He published an essay in the London and Westminster Review in 1838 
which criticized Bentham’s narrow view of human nature and underscored the 
difficulty of applying the utility principle.  Mill argued that happiness was too 
complex to be sought directly, effectively discounting the utility principle except 
as an “organizational discipline” (Hollander, 1985, 634). Benthamite utilitarianism 
limited the emotions humans could experience, Mill claimed.  Bentham was also 
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faulted for depicting pleasure and pain as aloof masters of human action, giving 
utilitarianism a cold nature.  Mill’s separation from Ricardian thought was even 
more pronounced.  While Mill never renounced utilitarianism, his qualifications 
of the labor theory of value led him to advocate an entirely different theory of 
value.  Mill considered it his duty as a disciple of both Bentham and Ricardo to 
resolve the faults in their theories, but his conclusions bore little resemblance to 
Benthamite and Ricardian thought.       
Mill believed Bentham’s principle of utility was too simplistic.  It was 
not enough to determine happiness solely on the quantity of pleasures received; 
the quality of pleasure also had to be taken into account.  There existed pleasures 
of such great quality that men would be unwilling to trade them for any quantity 
of lesser pleasures, even if more pain was associated with the greater pleasure (Mill, 
2006 [1861], 68).  Yet people could not automatically determine the quality of a 
pleasure, they had to cultivate and develop feelings in order to distinguish qualities 
of pleasure.  This stood in stark contradiction to Bentham’s belief that happiness 
was determined solely by the quantity of pleasures. Mill furthermore contradicted 
Bentham when he wrote that a person could act rationally without being happy 
(Mill, 2006 [1861], 74).  Mill believed that virtue, sacrificing one’s own happiness 
to increase the happiness of others trumped individual happiness.  Utilitarianism 
was not entirely individualistic and in fact had a critical social component.  The 
final major difference in utilitarianism Mill espoused regarded felicific calculus. 
If people calculated the consequences of every action they took, they would never 
have enough time to actually carry them out (Mill, 2006 [1861], 81).  Rather than 
spending this time calculating to maximize their own happiness, people had to 
promote the utility of society as a whole.  Thus while Mill was a proponent of 
utilitarianism, his utilitarianism was fundamentally different from Bentham’s in that 
it was much more complex and founded on the idea of social utility.    
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Principles revealed a much more drastic change in Mill than the one 
seen in Utilitarianism.  The divergence between Mill and Ricardo can be traced 
to how each treated the caveat in the labor theory of value that it only held when 
the ratio of capital to labor was equated across industries.  Since Ricardo’s labor 
theory of value consisted primarily of easily reproducible commodities, he largely 
disregarded this stipulation.  Although Mill accepted the labor theory of value, 
he was strongly influenced by the improbability of the capital-to-labor ratio 
qualification. He believed that the cost of production did determine the exchange 
values for goods but this was not synonymous with Ricardo’s theory of value. 
The cost of production included both the wages paid to the laborer and the 
remuneration for the capitalists’ abstinence (Mill, 1884 [1848], 265).  Value was 
thus derived from other prices.  There was no such thing as an invariable measure 
of value under realistic conditions.  This supposed improvement of Ricardo’s 
labor theory of value was actually a regression back to an adding-up theory of 
prices.  Mill’s theory of value was more Smithian than Ricardian.  There were also 
numerous inconsistencies between Ricardo’s and Mill’s view on profits.  While 
Ricardo contended that there was a tendency for profits to fall as capital was 
accumulated, Mill identified several counteracting tendencies which stabilized 
the rate of profit.  Factories became fixed capital and subsequently became sunk 
costs (Mill, 1884 [1848], 504).  If factories were sunk costs, they had no effect 
on wages or profits.  More efficient production enabled capital to be accumulated 
without lowering the rate of profit (Mill, 1884 [1848], 505).  Cheap commodities 
from foreign countries would also boost the rate of profits (Mill, 1884 [1848], 
506).  Capitalists could pay their workers lower wages if food prices declined and 
inexpensive raw materials would cut production costs.  Mill’s interpretation of 
value clashed with Ricardo’s despite his supposed discipleship.
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Conclusion: Mill vs. Marx
  John Stuart Mill considered himself a disciple of Ricardo because he 
believed in the capitalist system.  The socialist programs put forth by the likes of 
Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were either impractical or undesirable (Schwartz, 
1972, 191).  Mill identified himself as a Benthamite disciple because, like 
Bentham, he also sought to end class conflict.  Thus by combining utilitarianism 
with the labor theory of value, Mill wanted to show that capitalism and social 
harmony were not mutually exclusive.  He approached the class conflict generated 
by capitalism from a new perspective.  It was more radical than merely writing 
the subject off as a necessary part of capitalism but it was not so extreme that 
it called for an entirely different economic system.  Mill believed capitalism 
was flawed, but he also thought he could fix it.  It was impossible for him to 
be a disciple of Bentham and Ricardo simultaneously because they were biased 
from which classes they identified with.  Mill wanted to reconcile the worker 
and capitalist perspectives of capitalism to create a new form of capitalism.  As a 
result, his recommendations on policy reflected both Benthamite and Ricardian 
influences.  Bentham’s influence was most clearly seen in aspects of social policy. 
Like Bentham, Mill believed that equality under the law was necessary for social 
harmony (Mill, 2006 [1861], 99).  If lower classes were made responsible for 
their own lives and decisions, they would be more likely to improve their social 
standing.  But this increased responsibility meant that education needed to be 
reformed so the poor could be more informed decision makers, another similarity 
to Bentham.  In regards to economic policy, Mill had more in common with 
Ricardo.  He advocated international trade on the basis of comparative advantage 
(Mill, 1884 [1848], 380).  Mill also wrote that the government should make no 
distinction between classes (Mill, 1884 [1848], 539); the poor should not get 
special treatment simply for being poor.  Thus while Mill was against providing 
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the poor with excessive economic relief, he promoted the idea of treating them as 
social equals.  Economic equality would grow from this social equality.
This stood in stark contrast to the view of capitalism espoused by 
Mill’s peer, Karl Marx.  Marx believed the workers would rise up against the 
capitalists and introduce an era of socialism.  “As long as there are capitalists and 
workers, the workers will be exploited,” (Marx, 1963 [1848], 221) he proclaimed. 
Social harmony could only be achieved when class divisions were abolished. 
He advocated the abolishment of the Corn Laws because he believed it would 
accelerate the process of a proletarian revolution.  Marx thus took a critical, 
pessimistic view of capitalism whereas Mill believed it could work.  The schism 
in classical political economy was not so much the divide between the utility and 
labor theories of value as it was the opposing views on the future of capitalism, 
in particular what needed to be done about class conflict.  Mill tried to reconcile 
these views but was ultimately unsuccessful.  His proposed reform of capitalism 
did not have a lasting impact. Severe class divisions still dominate capitalist 
societies today.  In the end, Mill was overshadowed in the annals of economic 
thought because he was overly ambitious and took on an impossible task.  John 
Stuart Mill wanted to mend the image of capitalism.
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